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The Latest Kashmir Conflict Explained

India argues it is stabilizing Kashmir—but, Islamabad says it will have dire consequences for the region.

Wednesday, August 28, 2019 / By: Tara Kartha;  Jalil Jilani

Publication Type: Analysis

Editor’s Note: USIP Jennings Randolph Fellows Dr. Tara Kartha and Ambassador Jalil Jilani look at the latest crisis in Kashmir from their respective views. Dr. Kartha was a member of India’s National Security Council for 15 years and has over 30 years’ experience in national security policy. Amb. Jilani, a career Pakistani diplomat, is a former ambassador to the U.S. and former foreign secretary. This post represents the views of the authors and not those of USIP.

India aims to stabilize Jammu and Kashmir. But, why now?

Kartha: On August 5, India decided to take a long-considered move using article 370 of its constitution to change the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Although this has long been a part of the platform of Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the overwhelming majority of parliamentarians across all parties supported the decision—with 351 votes for and 72 against. Even the general secretary of the opposition Congress Party expressed his approval. This has been a move long in the making, with the backing of a wide swath of Indian political actors. But, the question remains, why now?

New Delhi made this move in an effort to stabilize Jammu and Kashmir and integrate it more fully with the Indian state. The Modi government’s decision is aimed at promoting local governance and encouraging investment in a state that has lagged behind for decades. The lack of effective local governance has hampered the development of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, including Ladakh, Jammu, and tourism dependant areas like Sonamarg and Gulmarg.  

Although much criticized, New Delhi’s stepped-up security and communications restrictions implemented along with the August 5 decision were lifted in 136 of 197 police station areas. Many schools have also reopened. Jammu and Kashmir will gradually return to normal, barring any terrorist activity or violence.

India believes that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir is final, and any unfinished business regarding partition of the greater Kashmir region only concerns areas occupied by Pakistan. Reorganizing Jammu and Kashmir made no territorial changes, but sought to more closely integrate the state with the rest of India. Therefore, for India, the dispute between India and Pakistan remains unchanged.

The advancement of U.S.-Taliban talks, and the imminence of a deal, has demonstrated to India that the U.S. is serious about withdrawing from Afghanistan. India fears that this could lead to history repeating itself. When another superpower, the Soviet Union, left Afghanistan some 30 years ago, intense terrorism in Kashmir immediately followed, as those who fought the Soviets turned to India.

To India, Islamabad’s objections to the move ring hollow. Over the years, Pakistan has unilaterally changed the status of other territories it occupies in the greater Kashmir region, namely Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. Just last year, Pakistan changed the structure of Azad Kashmir’s government. India protested the change. But, unlike Pakistani Prime Minister Khan’s warning of a heightened risk of war and terrorism following the August 5 decision, India did not resort to threats over Azad Kashmir.

Islamabad now has a choice. It can continue to support terrorism in Kashmir, which has not only devastated the region, but also severely hurt Pakistan’s economy. Or it can choose to cease such support and focus on its internal economic problems. Once the threat of terrorism is removed, there will surely be room for dialogue.

By rooting out terrorism, Pakistan can focus on economic development and more effectively leverage its immense resources to boost its economy. This could encourage economic linkages across the region, leading to greater regional stability in the long run.

What are the consequences for India, Pakistan and the region?

Jilani: India’s unilateral decision to revoke Article 370 of its constitution has severely hampered the chances of a renewal of the peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad. From Pakistan's perspective the Indian action constitutes a grave violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions on Kashmir and bilateral Pakistan-India agreements, such as the 1972 Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration.

Prime Minister Narenda Modi’s government’s decision will have far reaching consequences for Pakistan-India relations and regional peace and security. Islamabad says that increased repression and human rights violations by Indian forces in Indian Occupied Kashmir will breed violence, fuel indigenous uprising, and further generate tension with Pakistan. Yet, since August 5, India has mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, detained thousands of Kashmiris, and imposed a curfew resulting in food and medicine shortages. In Islamabad’s eyes, the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir has become a garrison area.

With the illegal steps taken by the Indian government—imposition of curfew, arrests of political leaders and blockade of communications—the situation has reached a tipping point. Intensifying violence in Indian-occupied Kashmir poses serious challenges for Pakistan and the region. These challenges include:

• For Pakistan, Kashmir remains the core issue and Islamabad cannot envision a dialogue with India that excludes the Kashmir issue.
• Islamabad rejects India’s claim that Kashmir is an internal matter, pointing to past and present international and bilateral calls for a peaceful resolution through dialogue. India’s move violates multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions and is unacceptable to Pakistan and the international community.
• The faint hope for a reasonable settlement based on the four-point formula—which became the basis of back-channel negotiations during the 2004-08 peace process and envisaged self-governance for Kashmiris, demilitarization, travel across the Line of Control and a monitoring mechanism, while also protecting the vital interests of the two countries—has been extinguished.
• Pakistan fears India could stage a false flag in either Jammu and Kashmir or mainland India and blame it on Pakistan in order to divert attention from the volatile situation in Kashmir.
• The possibility of direct Indian intervention in Azad Kashmir or subversion inside Pakistan cannot be ruled out. In case India directly intervenes in Pakistan or in Azad Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan (both of which are part of what the U.N. calls Pakistan-administered Kashmir), it could result in war between the nuclear powers with incalculable implications for both countries and the region.
• The outcome of the current Indian actions could result in more refugees from India into Pakistan.
• The latest Indian action will complicate the resolution of other long-standing disputes over issues like the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek.
• The Indian decision will adversely impact people-to-people contacts and trade relations between the two countries.
• Tension between India and Pakistan will have a negative impact on regional security. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation process is already suspended due to India-Pakistan tensions. India’s move is a further blow to regional cooperation.

Irrespective of India’s actions, the fact is that Kashmir is an internationally recognized disputed territory and will remain so until the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiris are fulfilled. India’s repression in Kashmir is unlikely to change this reality.

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International Edition

The Dueling Narratives of India’s Kashmir Crackdown

New Delhi’s actions have been welcomed domestically, but Narendra Modi’s government will have a hard time selling its message abroad.

A month ago, the Indian government abruptly voided the constitutional autonomy afforded to Kashmir. The announcement was made in Parliament with no warning, resulting in the splitting of what was a single state, formally known as Jammu and Kashmir, into two federally-run units whose rulers will be picked by New Delhi.

The move once again catapulted the decades-long dispute over Kashmir—parts of which are variously administered by India, Pakistan, and China—into the global spotlight. In the United States, India’s actions have attracted almost universally negative coverage: A spate of news stories and op-eds have highlighted the quashing of Kashmiri human rights, the risk of war between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, the threat to Indian federalism and democracy , and the rise of a muscular brand of Hindu nationalism hostile to Islam. (Before its dissolution, Jammu and Kashmir was India’s only Muslim-majority state.)

In India, by contrast, the government’s decision was widely welcomed. In Parliament, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party easily reconfigured a seven-decade-old political compact with the state over just two days. Several opposition parties supported the government, and even among those that did not, such as the left-of-center Congress Party, prominent leaders broke ranks to back the decision. Much of the Indian media, especially television-news channels, greeted it with undisguised glee . On YouTube and TikTok, scores of videos have sprouted to celebrate Modi’s “bold move.” The BJP will almost certainly showcase its decision in state elections later this year in northern and western India.

Why is an action so widely castigated internationally so wildly popular in India?

Turn first to Modi’s own justification for the decision: In a 40-minute televised address to the nation in Hindi, he argued it would boost economic development, fight corruption, and end gender, caste, and religious discrimination in the erstwhile state. As the prime minister put it, the voided constitutional provisions had “given nothing but secessionism, terrorism, nepotism and widespread corruption on a large scale” to Kashmir.

In Modi’s telling, Kashmir had languished too long as a backwater scarred by violence and ruled by corrupt dynastic politicians who siphoned off federal funds meant for the people. Tighter integration with the rest of India, he argued, will create  new jobs as both state-owned firms and private Indian enterprises rush to invest. Students can look forward to more government scholarships. Film crews will return to the iconic Kashmir Valley, once a Bollywood favorite. A new generation of Kashmiri leaders will rise to take their people toward a bright future in the benevolent embrace of Mother India.

Considering Modi’s popularity—225 million voters chose the BJP in national elections this year, giving it India’s largest political mandate in 35 years—it should surprise nobody that many of his compatriots find him persuasive. Moreover, his claims contain a kernel of truth. State laws preventing outsiders from owning property may have dampened investment in tourism, and refugees from Pakistan could not vote in state elections despite having lived in Kashmir for decades. In the end, Modi is selling a sunny promise of the future. Reject it as Pollyannaish and you risk looking like you want it to fail.

And while critics see the government’s decision, taken without consulting Kashmiris, as deeply undemocratic, many Indians view it differently. Since the 1950s, the BJP—then called the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—has campaigned to abrogate constitutional provisions that, at least in theory, limited New Delhi’s control over Jammu and Kashmir to defense, foreign affairs, and communications. The party manifesto this year repeated the pledge. By this logic, Modi won an election and kept his promise to voters. That’s what democratically elected politicians do.

What about the more than 500,000 Indian soldiers and paramilitary forces in Kashmir, 35,000 of whom were rushed into the state shortly before the government’s announcement? Kashmiris may resent their overbearing presence, but elsewhere in India they are seen as the good guys, serving selflessly amidst a hostile population. In February , a suicide bombing in Kashmir killed 40 Indian paramilitary troops traveling in a convoy, and provoked tit-for-tat air strikes between India and Pakistan.

Human-rights groups criticize Indian troops for blinding protesters with buckshot, but viewed from the other side, the use of pellet guns—rather than live rounds sometimes deployed in other Indian states —suggests concern for life, not unwarranted brutality. Indeed, the government says its shutdown of normal activities in the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley (including a month without internet or mobile-phone services) stems from a desire to save lives. Three years ago, more than 50 people died in protests after security forces killed Burhan Wani, a leader of the Islamist terrorist group Hizbul Mujahideen.

Over the years, mainstream public opinion in the rest of India toward Kashmir has hardened. In 1990, shortly after Kashmiri Muslims rose in revolt against Indian rule following rigged state elections three years prior, militants spurred the exodus of 250,000 to 400,000 Kashmiri pandits , Hindus whose presence in the valley pre-dates the coming of Islam to the region in the 14th century. Many BJP supporters weigh the suffering of Kashmiris today against the plight of the pandits, most of whom have not returned to their ancestral homes. They also resent what they see as the media’s excessive focus on the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley. Many people in Hindu-majority Jammu , and the sparsely populated Buddhist-majority Ladakh region, which is one of the new union territories, have welcomed the government’s decision.

Since Modi’s election in 2014, a crop of chest-thumping television-news channels broadly aligned with the BJP have used Kashmir as a convenient tool to whip up nationalist sentiment. Their Kashmir-related Twitter hashtags leave little to the imagination: #ServeIndiaNotPak , #NationLovesIndianArmy , #KashmirForAll , #IndiaAgainstAntiNationals . If anything, Hindi-language media are even more strident.

The popularity of Modi’s action means he faces no meaningful domestic pressure to take a gentler tack. Notwithstanding a flurry of outraged op-eds in English-language newspapers, domestic public opinion remains firmly with the BJP.

Outside India, it’s a different story. For the most part, with the exception of China, major powers have been loath to criticize India. The U.S. has reverted to its traditional position of treating Kashmir as a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan. At the G7 summit in Biarritz, President Donald Trump said , “The prime minister really feels he has it under control.” Many in Washington see India as a potential bulwark against Chinese hegemony in Asia. And Pakistan’s backing of terrorist groups in the valley has leached the Kashmir issue of international support. Even Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, drawn to India by business opportunities, have refused to take Pakistan’s side in the dispute.

Still, New Delhi will have a hard time selling its message outside its borders unless it changes its behavior. Bluntly put, India’s branding as the world’s largest democracy does not square with preemptively arresting up to 2,000 Kashmiris, including three former chief ministers of the state; suspending mobile-telephone networks and the internet for weeks; and locking up doctors for bringing attention to medicine shortages in the valley. Five members of the U.S. Congress, including Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Ilhan Omar, have publicly called on India to lift its communications blockade. More will likely follow.

To an impartial observer, India’s actions smack of collective punishment. Unlike Hindu chauvinists, reasonable people distinguish between a small number of Islamic militants and ordinary Kashmiris who just happen to be Muslim. Blinding civilian protesters with pellet guns suggests cruelty, not compassion, and at least one protester has died as a result of the Indian security forces’ actions. The jingoistic TV channels and permanently enraged social-media trolls used so effectively by the BJP to mold public opinion at home have little influence elsewhere. Modi’s Kashmir gambit may be popular with Indians, but it’s unlikely to win over the world.

From Domicile to Dominion: India’s Settler Colonial Agenda in Kashmir

• See full issue

On August 5, 2019, the Indian government revoked the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir 1 by abrogating Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian Constitution. 2 Although many saw Article 370 as largely symbolic, Article 35A of the Constitution had a practical function for preserving Kashmiri identity. Article 35A vested Kashmir’s legislative assembly with the sole authority to define “permanent residents.” Significantly, the local government was able to affix special privileges — such as the ability to purchase land — to permanent residents. The effect was that only Kashmiris could own property in a region that India has long claimed as its own. In revoking Article 35A, the Indian government unearthed a fear that Kashmiris had been wrestling with since Independence: that India would recruit non-Kashmiri settlers to dilute the region’s ethnic and religious makeup.

August 5, then, marked a critical turning point in the Kashmir dispute. Although the colonial lens has been applied to Kashmir in the past, the abrogation suggests that the settler colonial lens may be more fitting. Settler colonialism is premised on the recruitment of a settler class whose goal is not only to occupy indigenous land but also to eliminate the indigenes who stand in their way. Thus, as non-Kashmiris flood the region as new residents, India’s identity as a settler state comes to the fore.

The law often plays a crucial role in facilitating the erasure and elimination of indigenous communities in settler colonial projects. Exploring features of the post-Partition legal regime — especially military impunity, arbitrary detention, and displacement — reveals how the settler colonial mindset animated India’s relationship with Kashmir long before the events of August 5th.

This Note uses settler colonial theory to explain how the August 5 abrogation came about. It begins by laying out a theoretical framework for understanding settler colonialism. Next, it contextualizes and documents the legally momentous events of August 5, 2019, highlighting both the thwarted promises of Kashmiri autonomy and the growing settler colonial desire to control Kashmir and its land. It concludes by analyzing the legal regime that facilitated the full emergence of the settler project today. While August 5 may have been the tipping point for the settler colonial project in Kashmir, it was in no way the start.

I. Settler Colonialism as a Lens

For some, August 5 will join the unfortunate list of days of colonial and “post-colonial” violence: Australia Day, Waitangi Day, Yawm an-Nakba, and Columbus Day. 3 Scholars and commentators fear that abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A will precipitate India’s “settler colonial project” in Kashmir: India can now recruit non-Kashmiris to dilute the region’s predominantly Muslim population. 4 Settler colonial studies is a relatively new field of interest in post-colonial literature. Traditionally a school of anthropological and political thought, settler colonialism has often been applied to dissect the struggles of indigenous communities in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia. 5 Scholars have also extended the framework to explain the twentieth-century settler projects waged against Palestinians. 6

Colonialism and settler colonialism are distinct, yet intertwined, modes of oppression. While both entail migration and a relationship of ascendency, their ultimate desires are fundamentally different. 7 Colonizers say, “[Y]ou, work for me,” settler colonizers say, “[Y]ou, go away.” 8

Classic colonialism is “a system of domination” facilitated by territorial acquisition. 9 The colonizers, in dominating an indigenous majority, act to fulfill the interests of their distant metropolis. 10 Their goal is not to stay in their newly sought territory, but rather to exploit profits to “sustain the permanent subordination of the colonised.” 11

The primary objective of settler colonialism, by contrast, is to permanently occupy the colonized territory: settler states recruit settler classes that “bring with them a purported sovereign prerogative to establish a new state on someone else’s land.” 12 To sustain their dominion, settler states — with the help of a local administration 13 — will spin narratives of a unique cultural identity, create independent structures of law and order, and rely on both military and economic power. 14 Law, in particular, often cements and expands a settler colonial project. 15 The law not only establishes and reestablishes the allocation of land and resources but also controls the distribution of violence in a settler regime. 16

In settler colonialism, territory is fetishized. 17 Land is the object of desire; the place where settlers can imagine a society of their choosing on land perceived as their own. 18 In the heat of this desire, settlers rationalize the elimination of the indigenous who complicate the realization of their imagined polity. 19 It is the synchronization of these forces that gives the project its distinctive feature: replacement. 20

To replace is to eliminate the indigenous population. This replacement is driven by the “logic of elimination.” The “logic of elimination,” famously coined by Professor Patrick Wolfe, 21 does not necessary entail violence. To eliminate the indigenous equally includes displacement, forced assimilation, and the induced disappearance of indigenous heritage and institutions. 22 Whereas classic colonialism is marked by a vicious cycle where the freedom of the colonized is perpetually postponed, true settler colonialism will “extinguish[] itself,” so there is no indigenous community to stand in distinction from the realized settler one. 23 The indigenous identity, unlike the colonized one, is entirely dispensable. 24

II. The Denial of Autonomy

To understand the nature of the abrogation, one first needs to understand the autonomy promised to Kashmiris in the aftermath of the Partition of British India. This Part details that history, noting not only how Article 370 came to be but also how it was subsequently whittled to a legal fiction. It shows that Kashmir’s autonomy was hollowed by no small coincidence — a growing settler desire for Kashmir and its sacralized land facilitated the modern settler colonial project in the region.

A. The Making of Article 370

The recent changes to Kashmir’s legal framework trace back to the region’s contested story in the Partition of British India. 25 In August 1947, Jammu and Kashmir was one of the largest “princely states” in the Indian subcontinent. 26 The region was culturally and topographically heterogeneous, and uniquely abutted both Indian and Pakistani frontiers. 27 It included what is now the largely Hindu, low-hilled region of Jammu; the majority-Muslim valley of Kashmir; and the Buddhist and Shia Muslim, high-peaked Ladakh. 28 Notably, the princely state, although predominantly Muslim, was ruled by a Hindu king, Maharaja Hari Singh. 29

How would Kashmir’s future manifest in a free Indian subcontinent? For other princely states, the question reduced to one of religion: majority-Muslim states would follow Pakistan and the rest, India. 30 However, given its geographic and demographic complexities, Jammu and Kashmir did not fit neatly into this binary. 31 Both the Maharaja’s own preference for an independent Kashmir 32 and a growing movement of Kashmiris revolting against the Maharaja 33 only complicated this arithmetic further.

Thus, when confronted with the question of accession, the Maharaja opted instead for “standstill agreements” that left Kashmir’s sovereignty intact. 34 But such agreements did not last very long. In what is a largely contested history, 35 the arrival of armed groups from Pakistan forced Maharaja Singh’s hand: he signed the Instrument of Accession in exchange for India’s defensive support. 36 Despite assurances for a plebiscite from Indian government officials 37 and later the United Nations, 38 an inquiry into the desires of the people never took place. Instead, what resulted was the first of three wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir 39 and the drafting of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

Article 370 set out to create an expansive, explicit, and sui generis semi-autonomous regime for the state. First, Article 370 curtailed the powers of the central government over Kashmir to three domains: defense, external affairs, and communication. 40 Only Article I of the Indian Constitution and Article 370 itself would apply to the state of their own force, 41 though other constitutional provisions could be applied through presidential orders, provided they received the “consultation” or “concurrence” of the state government. 42 Lastly, it provided that the President could render the article inoperative “by public notification,” but only with “the recommendation of the [state] Constituent Assembly.” 43 In effect, Jammu and Kashmir became the only state empowered to block the application of federal legislation by not passing it in the state legislature. 44

One of the most critical exercises of Article 370 powers was the adoption of Article 35A to the Indian Constitution via Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954. 45 The order empowered the state legislature to both define the “permanent residents” of the state and attach specific privileges to such residency, including the ability to settle in the state and purchase land and immovable property. 46

With this legal regime as the backdrop, the Constituent Assembly adopted its own state constitution to further define the relationship between the region and the government of India. 47 Building on the prior order, the Constitution notably limited “permanent residents” to long-time residents in the State. 48 The effect of this provision was to safeguard Kashmir from outsiders — a movement initially launched by Kashmiri Hindus hoping to keep “Kashmir for Kashmiris” in the 1920s. 49 Although the Constituent Assembly later dissolved, the Supreme Court maintained that Article 370 “continue[d] to be in force.” 50

B. A Hollowed Autonomy

Article 370’s “force” proved to be de minimis. Just as the plebiscite was a “pledge not redeemed,” 51 Article 370’s promise of autonomy was largely unfulfilled. In the years following Partition, forty-seven presidential orders extended 260 of the Indian Constitution’s 395 articles to Kashmir. 52 India removed Kashmir’s unique legal features — like the Prime Ministership. 53 Litigation “to remove destructive provisions of the Article 370” is not a present-day anomaly; 54 even where litigation was unsuccessful, the article’s dilution was not. 55 The federal and state administrative apparatus — from elections to Indian central rule over the state — has largely facilitated this dilution. 56 In particular, elections have largely been criticized as “showpiece[s] of [Indian] legitimacy” in Kashmir. 57 The introduction of national parliamentary elections eroded the distinction between Kashmir and the rest of India. 58 As for state elections, an interventionist central government often uninstalled, reinstalled, and hand-picked local leaders. 59 The result? A gradient of “pro-India” state political parties. 60

The use of Governor’s 61 and President’s 62 Rule in Kashmir has repeatedly subjected the region to the political whims of the central government. Both machineries effectively accomplish the same ends 63 : where the state government is perceived as inoperable, Kashmir is put under central rule of the Indian government via a federally appointed governor. 64 Having entered central rule eight times 65 and having faced the longest duration of President’s Rule of any state in India, 66 central rule has particularly silenced Kashmiri political voices. During Kashmir’s longest spell of President’s Rule, the problematic 67 Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 68 and the Public Safety Act 69 were respectively extended to and expanded in the region. 70 And indeed, it was the use of President’s rule that enabled the 2019 abrogation. 71

As India chipped away at Kashmir’s autonomy, a Kashmiri freedom struggle was amplified. The movement has taken on rich unarmed forms, including protests, boycotts, graffiti, rap, and marking Indian Independence Day as a “Black Day.” 72 But it also has had its armed moments, which resulted in the forcible removal and killing of members of the Kashmiri Hindu minority following controversial elections in the late 1980s. 73

Parallel to the freedom movement is an Indian-launched counterinsurgency strategy, framed around terrorism and facilitated by the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops to Kashmir. 74 Human rights groups estimate that there is one armed person for every seventeen civilians and roughly seven armed personnel to every square kilometer of land in the region, 75 securing Kashmir’s title as one of the world’s most densely militarized regions. 76 These numbers stand in stark contrast to India’s estimates of perceived “militants,” which are only in the hundreds. 77 The militarization has spawned a valley rife with human rights abuse. 78

Ultimately, Article 370 was much more a symbol of Kashmir’s desired autonomy than the mechanism for implementing it. To the extent that Article 370 had more than symbolic weight, it was manifested in Article 35A, which remained largely untouched by the federal government. By safeguarding the rights to owning land, Article 35A served as Kashmir’s primary line of defense against outside interference. To tinker with these articles, then, would be “to set[] a powder keg on fire.” 79

C. Cultivating a Settler Desire

The erosion of Kashmir’s autonomy paralleled — and perhaps stemmed from — a growing narrative of desire for Kashmir. While Kashmir’s land was long “prize[d]” 80 for its fertile soil and strategic geographic location, 81 this India-crafted narrative had a more intimate fervor. Kashmir — said the first Prime Minister of India — was a “supremely beautiful woman, whose beauty is almost impersonal and above human desire.” 82 It is ultimately this desire that has furthered the settler colonial project today.

The lopsided emphasis on Kashmir’s Hindu heritage has supplied non-Kashmiri Hindus with both the reason to desire the region and the justifications to do so. 83 In particular, the promotion of the Amarnath Yatra — a Hindu pilgrimage to an ice formation believed to represent Lord Shiva 84 — has grown increasingly over the years through increased institutional support. 85 Such support has been particularly effective where it has equated the pilgrimage with national pride — where the “yearning for Moksha (salvation)” was also “a befitting gesture of solidarity with . . . soldiers . . . fighting the enemy to defend our borders.” 86

By bringing Hindu temples and relics to the fore, the Indian state and its proponents have only fueled the idea that it is Muslim Kashmiris who are the “exogenous ‘Others.’” 87 In fact, India has crafted Kashmir’s public identity into a Hindu one, as more and more highly romanticized pilgrimages emerge in the Kashmir Valley. 88 Indeed, it was the Amarnath pilgrimage that the state heavily advertised in the months leading up to the abrogation. 89 Ultimately, where India is depicted as the Hindu imaginary “Bharat Mata” (Mother India), Kashmir, in India’s eyes, is her head. 90

Kashmir’s militarization is designed to make Kashmir a place non-Kashmiri Hindus can feel entitled to claim as their own, and to reimagine a Kashmiri identity that excludes its Muslim population. The Amarnath pilgrimage is a full exercise of militarized tourism, packaged neatly under the title “Operation Shiva.” 91 By emphasizing the danger in the Valley with each annual pilgrimage, 92 the military is there to remind pilgrims not only that this is their land but also that they can feel safe in it. 93 India has similarly used the military in proposals for returning the Kashmiri Hindu diaspora back to the region, suggesting enclosed, heavily guarded colonies equipped with their own amenities. 94 This ahistorical vision of a Kashmiri society without Kashmiri Muslims underscores the state’s investment in eliminating the aspects of Kashmiri identity that challenge its settler colonial narrative.

This settler narrative, like most, was still intimately linked to the land, with the Indian state having illegally seized Kashmiri territory well before the abrogation. As of 2018, military forces had illegally grabbed nearly 54,000 acres of land in Kashmir. 95 Included in this occupied land is not just strategic borders but civilian infrastructure like hotels, sports stadiums, university facilities, and hospitals. 96 Occupied land has also frequently, and perhaps conveniently, overlapped with resource-rich regions, like those known for saffron production. 97 Although unsuccessful, the central government had even attempted to transfer forest land to construct temporary shelters and facilities for Amarnath pilgrims. 98

India’s settler-like desire has infected every aspect of life in Kashmir. Signs greeting Indian tourists in Kashmir emphasize not only that Kashmir is atoot ang — an “integral part” — of India, but also that it is “India’s crown,” and that to “[l]ove Kashmir, [is to] love India.” 99 Development projects, like the Kashmir Railway Project, underscore attempts to further Kashmir’s assimilation into the nation. 100 Bollywood cinema has also exploited Kashmir’s landscape for nationalist ends, first portraying it as “a pastoral space emptied of popular unrest or political aspirations” 101 and later “chastiz[ing] the Valley” for forgetting this imagined past. 102 Those same movies regularly depict romance between the Indian male tourist and the Kashmiri woman 103 — a not-so-subtle allegory for assimilation and replacement.

India’s settler desire was most pronounced with the 2014 election, and then 2019 reelection, of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Kashmiris, in BJP’s India, were “contrapuntal symbols — of terrorist violence, illegitimate religious impulses, and sedition — for contriving [their] mythical Hindu nation.” 104 Realizing the Hindu nation required the abrogation of Article 370, an explicit promise made by the BJP in their 2019 election manifesto. 105

III. A Settler Colonial Project Realized

Before launching their legal attack on August 5, the Indian government waged a familiar psychological one. 106 It began with the further militarization of the region. 107 Then, the government evacuated thousands of Hindu pilgrims and tourists on August 3, citing a Pakistani-backed terrorist attack. 108 Non-Kashmiri students attending Kashmiri universities were also ordered to leave. 109 When pressed, Indian officials explicitly assured state political leaders that abrogating Articles 370 and 35A was not in question; any reports otherwise were “rumor mongering.” 110 Their assurances, later exposed as lies, launched Kashmiris into a familiar cadence: canceling family events, moving ill family members near hospitals, and stockpiling essentials. 111

By August 5, the siege was in full swing. India imposed a curfew and officers patrolled barbed-wired streets. 112 Former heads of state and pro-freedom leaders were arrested. 113 Both internet and cell phone services were suspended. 114 Before India even made its incendiary attack, Kashmir and its people were left in the dark.

With the political backdrop of President’s rule in Kashmir, 115 the President of India issued Constitutional Order 272. 116 Pursuant to Article 370, the order amended Article 367 — which enshrines the Constitution’s interpretative framework 117 — as it relates to Jammu and Kashmir. 118 Although Article 370 requires the state government’s concurrence to make such a change, 119 the President took the Governor’s consent as a sufficient substitute. 120

C.O. 272 had two key consequences. First, it streamlined the process to amend and abrogate Article 370, requiring only consultation with the Governor. 121 Second, by superseding 122 the constitutional order from which Article 35A germinated, it made Article 35A inoperative. 123

The legal changes that flowed from C.O. 272’s groundwork were swift. On August 5, the upper house of Parliament passed a statutory resolution recommending the President of India proceed with Article 370’s abrogation. 124 Later that day, Presidential Order C.O. 273 acted upon the recommendation, causing Article 370 to “cease to be operative” and affixing all provisions of the Indian Constitution upon Kashmir. 125 In parallel, the Parliament also passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019. 126 The Act fractured the state into two union territories, 127 which would be under the direct control of the central government. One union territory included Jammu and the Kashmir Valley; the other, Ladakh. 128 Thus, over a few days, the Government of India not only revoked Kashmir’s special autonomous status but also erased its identity as a state altogether. While screams in opposition rang through the chambers of Parliament, 129 the deathly silence in Kashmir was more stifling. The entire map of Kashmir had changed without its people knowing. 130

On August 15, 2019, India would simultaneously celebrate its seventy-third Independence Day and forcibly hold Kashmiris under lockdown. 131 What seemed like a sinister irony became the norm. In the seven months that followed, 132 Kashmiris would spend Eid, 133 weddings, 134 medical emergencies, 135 and funerals 136 in an eerie blackout. The economic loss — an estimated $2.4 billion — would pale in comparison only to the human one. 137 Kashmiri lives were inundated with reported army-instigated torture of children, sexual violence against women, disappearing of young men, 138 and arbitrary detention of civilians. 139 Twenty-three petitions challenging the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A are pending in the Supreme Court of India, but the Court’s pattern of avoidance on the Kashmir issue does not bode well for Kashmiris. 140

IV. The Legal “Elimination” of the Kashmiri

The use of the settler colonial lens in Kashmir largely emerged in the aftermath of the abrogation. Critical Kashmir Studies have typically focused on the paradigms of illegal occupation, 141 armed conflict, 142 self-determination, 143 and colonization. 144 Even then, discussions of the settler colonial model in Kashmir have either focused primarily on a socio-political analysis or given a cursory legal one. 145 This Part focuses on the Indian and Kashmiri state law that has facilitated the gradual “elimination” of the indigenous Kashmiri. While the events of the abrogation were critical in making the purchase of land possible for new settlement communities, exploring Kashmir’s post-Partition legal infrastructure reveals how the settler colonial mindset has animated India’s relationship with the region long before the events of 2019. In particular, a military impunity regime, arbitrary detentions, and displacement are key facilitators of the project. In the words of Kashmiri scholars, “5 August was . . . not a beginning, not a diversion, not a rupture,” but the extension of seventy years of mass killings, blindings, torturings, disappearances, and rape, 146 all of which advanced the mission to — physically and symbolically — “eliminate” the Kashmiri.

A. Abuse and Impunity

In Kashmir, settler colonial and military machinery have “intertwine[d] with great and familiar intimacy.” 147 The latter has ultimately enabed the goal of the former: to erase. Although an official number has never been released, activists conservatively estimate that almost 700,000 members of the Indian army are stationed in Kashmir. 148 Intense human rights abuses have flowed from the militarization of Kashmiri soil. From 2008 to 2018 alone, an estimated 1,081 Kashmiri civilians were “eliminated” by security forces in extrajudicial executions. 149 Since the start of the pro-freedom uprising in 1989, activists estimate that at least 8,000 Kashmiris have been disappeared. 150 These tragedies are compounded by thousands of unknown, unmarked, and mass graves and incalculable cases of torture and sexual violence. 151

A regime of military de jure and de facto impunity has perpetuated abuse against Kashmiri bodies. At the heart of this impunity is the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1990. AFSPA in Jammu and Kashmir is modeled off the national Armed Forces Special Powers Act 152 and was passed at a time when the state was under Governor’s Rule. 153 Similar legal regimes have been enacted in “disturbed areas” across India. 154 Although the definition of what constitutes “disturbed” is vague, the determination is the central government’s authority and is not subject to review. 155

The legislation emerged in Kashmir following a declaration that the Kashmir Valley had become “disturbed” in 1990, and has applied ever since. 156 AFSPA vests officers with sweeping authority: they can use deadly force in instances where they are not at imminent risk. 157 AFSPA grants armed forces the broad power to destroy property from which “armed attacks” are “likely” or “attempted” to be made; 158 arrest without warrant; 159 enter and search without warrant; 160 and stop, search, and seize vehicles. 161 In short, actions that would otherwise be an abuse both of Indian criminal and human rights law are now simply a “use” of AFSPA. 162 Through AFSPA, the Indian state is not only empowered to exert “free and ruthless force” 163 against Kashmiri bodies but also is invited to do so within the law.

Notably, AFSPA includes an explicit immunity clause: “No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with previous sanction of the Central Government” against officials acting under AFSPA. 164 The realities of the immunity clause have been devastating. In the last twenty-eight years, neither the Home Secretary nor the Defense Secretary has approved a single prosecution under AFSPA. 165 Moreover, there is concern that AFSPA’s immunity has bled into proceedings against police officials, making them nearly impossible to launch. 166 Although activists throughout India have challenged the AFSPA’s constitutionality, the Court has held that the army’s powers are not “unreasonable” or “arbitrary.” 167

If the impunity regime created by AFSPA does not reveal India’s attempts to silence the indigenous, the AFSPA’s origins perhaps do. AFSPA took its inspiration from a British colonial ordinance — the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Ordinance of 1942 — utilized to suppress the “Quit India Movement” in India’s battle for independence. 168 The rationales for the modern-day AFSPA are not far from the colonial ones: upholding the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of India” and combating “terrorist acts.” 169 This kind of parallel is not unique to the Kashmir case — “colonial and settler colonial forms[] often coexist and mutually support each other.” 170

B. Detention

In addition to the problems created by impunity, an arbitrary detention regime has also erased Kashmiri voices from civil society. Described with other Indian detention laws as “lawless” by the Supreme Court, 171 the Public Safety Act (PSA) enables a preventative detention regime that operates largely outside the typical criminal justice system.

The state government introduced the PSA in 1978, “ostensibly to crack down on timber smugglers” in the region. 172 Since then, the PSA has been applied to a variety of perceived “dangers,” 173 including the entrance of unauthorized persons into prohibited places, 174 the circulation of documents “likely to affect public order,” 175 and, of course, individuals who “act in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.” 176 The PSA permits the detention of individuals for one year if they’ve acted “prejudicial[ly] to the maintenance of public order,” 177 and for up to two years if they’ve acted “prejudicial[ly] to the security of the State.” 178 The detaining official must only be “satisfied” that the facts presented meet this threshold, and no criminal charge or suspicion of criminal activity is required. 179

The PSA does not include the traditional protections bestowed by the criminal justice system. For example, detaining authorities can delay communicating the grounds of detention for up to ten days, and even then, authorities have broad discretion regarding which facts they must disclose. 180 Detainees are also entirely without access to judicial authority, facing bars on accessing legal representation, judicial review of the grounds of detention, and judicial appeal. 181

The only legal remedy for arbitrary detention under the PSA is to petition the high court of the state or the Supreme Court through habeas corpus. 182 Unfortunately, habeas corpus in Kashmir is obsolete, 183 resulting in the figurative and literal disappearing of Indigenous Kashmiri bodies. At the height of India’s counterinsurgency operation in the 1990s, the concerned relatives of disappeared persons filed thousands of habeas petitions. 184 The majority went unheard due to “pervasive patterns of delays, non-compliance with judicial directions by executive and military authorities, and judicial normalization of impunity.” 185 Habeas has been no more promising in recent years. One year after the abrogation, over 400 people — including former heads of state, pro-freedom leaders, and lawyers — were detained via the PSA. 186

As with AFSPA, the PSA’s rationale illuminates a settler desire for erasure. Formally, the PSA takes a “holistic approach” to “overcome the menace of terrorism and secessionism” that “challenge[s] the integrity and sovereignty of the state.” 187 Informally, as described by a former state politician, the aim is to keep recalcitrant Kashmiris “out of circulation.” 188

The PSA has not only depicted the Kashmiri as dangerous but also, in collaboration with AFSPA, established a legal “death zone[]” 189 critical to the operation of the settler regime. It is in this zone — where impunity and detention run rampant — that Kashmiris are caged “as existential and demographic threats.” 190 The veneer of terrorism-based justifications does little to change this reality. The intense militarization of indigenous soil and the “spatially differentiated policing of populations” suggest that “the ‘terrorist’ stands in for the ‘Native.’” 191

C. Displacement

While the laws discussed above are animated by the settler colonial logic, Article 35A’s abrogation makes the recruitment of a settler community on indigenous land a reality. 192 The abrogation secures “settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element”: “territoriality.” 193 Without Article 35A, India can now use the territory of Kashmir for investment, natural resources, and a new community of residents.

While India continued its clampdown in Kashmir, the downstream effects of the abrogation continued to materialize. The government earmarked land for non-Kashmiri investors 194 and planned an investment summit to facilitate the bidding. 195 The August 5 abrogation has also paved the way for exploitative resource extraction in the region. Kashmir’s special status ensured that nonlocal businesses were barred from operating in the region without a lease agreement with the government. 196 Starting in January following the abrogation, all mining bids were solicited online at a time when internet connectivity was still restricted in Kashmir. 197 The result was a “death blow to [Kashmiri] business” 198 : for the first time, almost seventy percent of mineral extraction contracts in Kashmir were procured by non-Kashmiris. 199

The Indian government also introduced a new domicile order 200 that expands the definition for residency and allows a new class of non-Kashmiris to move into the region. This legal maneuver mirrored the use of “registration by title” to facilitate the expropriation of indigenous lands in Palestine and Australia. 201 The order now permits Indian citizens who have lived in the region for a set period of time to claim a “domicile certificate.” 202 The children of those domiciled can also claim their own certificates, even without ever having entered the region. 203 These provisions extend to armed forces stationed in Kashmir and their children as well, 204 making the hundreds of thousands of armed forces in Kashmir a potentially new class of settlers themselves. By claiming domicile, these non-Kashmiris can now apply for all local government jobs, including those in police or administration, that were previously reserved for Kashmiris.

However, a new land order may have already superseded the domicile laws in importance, having repealed twelve former state land laws and amended fourteen others. 205 The order erased Article 35A’s vestiges, largely removing the “permanent residency” clause across Kashmir’s land regime. 206 Notably, it did not limit land transactions to newly defined domiciliaries. The law also empowers non-Kashmiris to repurpose agricultural land, which constitutes ninety percent of the region, for nonagricultural purposes. 207 Similarly concerning is the government’s ability to designate “strategic area[s]” for military use without the previously required consultation with local government. 208 While the full effects of these reforms are unknown, one thing is clear: “J&K is now up for sale . . . .” 209

Although the government has justified its actions in the name of development, 210 such pretexts have been laid bare in the American regime: “There was never a time when the white man said he was trying to help the Indian get into the mainstream of American life that he did not also demand that the Indian give up land . . . .” 211

Mahjoora des sonuy, Mahjoor, our motherland,

baagah chhu nundabonuy, Is the loveliest on earth!

ath lol gatghi baronuy, Shall we not love her best?

gulshan vatan chhu sonuy… A garden is our land!

— Ghulam Ahmad Mahjoor 212

This Kashmiri freedom verse, first written in the 1980s, perhaps best evinces the threat that the abrogation poses: the loss of Kashmiris’ motherland. By giving an expanded class of non-Kashmiris access to new forms of livelihood and land, India has made the settlement of a new class of residents viable and attractive. The abrogation of Article 35A and the laws that have followed it are quintessential settler colonial violence, but so too are the legal regimes that came before the abrogation. Fueled by a growing settler narrative around Kashmir, India has long utilized the law to not just colonially oppress Kashmiris but erase them altogether.

^ Hereainafter also referred to as “Kashmir.” “Kashmir” refers to the India-occupied region of Jammu and Kashmir, which largely consists of the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh. See Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir 5–6 (rev. ed. 2015).

^ India Revokes Kashmir’s Special Status , Al Jazeera (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/india-revokes-kashmir-special-status-190904143838166.html [ https://perma.cc/AZ3C-GG37 ].

^ See Azeezah Kanji, A How-To Guide for the Settler Colonial Present: From Canada to Palestine to Kashmir , Yellowhead Inst . (Aug. 5, 2020), https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2020/08/05/marking-the-settler-colonial-present-from-canada-to-palestine-to-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/MR3Z-Z54V ].

^ See, e.g ., Hafsa Kanjwal, Opinion, India’s Settler-Colonial Project in Kashmir Takes a Disturbing Turn , Wash. Post (Aug. 5, 2019, 6:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/08/05/indias-settler-colonial-project-kashmir-takes-disturbing-turn [ https://perma.cc/4WCQ-BMN9 ].

^ See generally A. Grenfell Price ,  White Settlers and Native Peoples (1950) (comparing the effects of white settler colonialism on indigenous populations of North America, New Zealand, and Australia).

^ See generally, e.g ., Maxime Rodinson , Israel: A Colonial-Settler State? (1973); Nadim N. Rouhana & Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, Settler-Colonial Citizenship: Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Israel and Its Palestinian Citizens , 5 Settler Colonial Stud . 205 (2015).

^ Lorenzo Veracini, Introducing Settler Colonial Studies, 1 Settler Colonial Stud . 1, 1 (2011).

^ See Natsu Taylor Saito , Settler Colonialism, Race, and the Law 43 (Ediberto Roman ed., 2020) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jürgen Osterhammel ,  Colonialism 4 (Shelley L. Frisch trans., Markus Wiener Publishers 2d ed. 2005) (1995)).

^ Id . at 45–47.

^ Veracini, supra note 7, at 2.

^ Saito , supra note 9 , at 51 .

^ A local administration is “charged with maintaining order and authority” on behalf of the settler state. Caroline Elkins & Susan Pedersen, Settler Colonialism: A Concept and Its Uses , in Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century 1, 4 (Caroline Elkins & Susan Pedersen eds., 2005).

^ See Saito , supra note 9, at 52.

^ See David Lloyd & Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonial Logics and the Neoliberal Regime , 6 Settler Colonial Stud . 109, 114 (2016).

^ See Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native , 8 J. Genocide Rsch . 387, 388 (2006).

^ See Saito , supra note 9, at 51.

^ See Wolfe, supra note 17, at 388.

^ Patrick Wolfe, Nation and MiscegeNation: Discursive Continuity in the Post-Mabo Era , 36 Soc. Analysis 93, 93 (1994).

^ See Lorenzo Veracini, Essay, The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation , 42 J. Palestine Stud . 26, 28 (2013) (emphasis omitted).

^ See Veracini, supra note 7, at 3.

^ “From [the Maharaja’s decision to accede] all else has flowed; and its consequences are with us still.” Alastair Lamb , Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990 , at 2 (1991).

^ The princely system relied on nested sovereignty, where princes exercised near-autonomy while still heeding the title of the British monarchy. Ramachandra Guha , India After Gandhi 36–37 (2008).

^ See id . at 59.

^ See Mona Bhan et al., “ Rebels of the Streets”: Violence, Protest, and Freedom in Kashmir , in Resisting Occupation in Kashmir 1, 5 (Haley Duschinski et al. eds., 2019).

^ Guha , supra note 26, at 60.

^ See Neera Chandhoke , Contested Secessions: Rights, Self-determination, Democracy, and Kashmir 19 (2012).

^ See Matthew J. Webb, Escaping History or Merely Rewriting It? The Significance of Kashmir’s Accession to Its Political Future , 20 Contemp. S. Asia 471, 477 (2012).

^ See Guha , supra note 26, at 64.

^ See generally Mridu Rai , Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects 224–87 (2019) (discussing Kashmiri political mobilization against the “Hindu State” under the ruling dynasty).

^ See Webb, supra note 31, at 477.

^ Hotly debated still is why and how these invaders came to Kashmir. Some accounts characterize the invasion as Pakistani orchestrated to secure Kashmir; others present an independent group rushing to liberate subjugated Muslims suffering under an oppressive Hindu rule in Kashmir. Guha , supra note 26, at 64–65.

^ The Maharaja’s Letter to the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten (Oct. 26, 1947), reprinted in A.G. Noorani , Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir 41–42 (2011). Circumstances surrounding the Maharaja’s signing of the Instrument of Accession are also contested, with scholars arguing that the accession was induced through false promises. See, e.g ., Chandhoke , supra note 30, at 101.

^ Letters between Lord Mountbatten and Maharaja Singh suggest that although India would aid Kashmir militarily given the invasion, “as soon as law and order ha[d] been restored in Kashmir . . . the question of the State’s accession should have been settled by a reference to the people.” Letter from Governor-General, India, Delhi, to Maharaja Sahib (Oct. 27, 1947) , reprinted in Noorani , supra note 36, at 43 [hereinafter Letter from Governor-General].

^ Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc’y, Occupational Hazard: The Jammu and Kashmir Floods of September 2014 , at 4–5 (2015).

^ See Letter from Governor-General, supra note 37, at 42–43.

^ India Const. art. 370, cl. 1(a–b).

^ Id . cl. 1(c).

^ Presidential orders require the “consultation” for matters within the three domains and the “concurrence” for all other matters. Id . cl. 1(d).

^ Id . cl. 3.

^ Haseeb A. Drabu, Opinion, Modi’s Majoritarian March to Kashmir , N.Y. Times (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/08/opinion/modis-majoritarian-march-to-kashmir.html [ https://perma.cc/B3RY-NTVM ].

^ Ministry of Law, Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, C.O. 48 (Issued on May 14, 1954).

^ Id . pt. 4, cl. (j). Other states in India have similar restrictions on land ownership as described in Vakasha Sachdev, Despite J&K Changes, You Still Can’t Buy Land in These States , The Quint (Oct. 29, 2020, 9:29 AM), https://www.thequint.com/news/india/jammu-kashmir-land-laws-amended-other-states-where-outsiders-cant-purchase-property-himachal-sikkim-arunachal-tribal-areas [ https://perma.cc/N3ES-U6N9 ].

^ Jammu and Kashmir Const., Nov. 17, 1956, arts. 3–5.

^ Specifically, “permanent residents” was limited to those who were living in the state as of May 14, 1954, when the law came into effect, and those who had lived in the state for ten years prior to that date and had legally acquired immovable property in the state. Id . art. 6.

^ See Mridu Rai, History of Betrayals in Kashmir , Frontline (Aug. 30, 2019), <a href="https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article29053014.ece ">https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article29053014.ece [ https://perma.cc/U6YN-8BHV ].

^ State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta, AIR 2017 SC 25, ¶ 12.

^ Rai , supra note 33, at 289.

^ See Angana P. Chatterji, Kashmir: A Place Without Rights , Just Sec . (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71840/kashmir-a-place-without-rights [ https://perma.cc/Y4GS-QD4Z ].

^ Jeffrey Gettleman et al., India Revokes Kashmir’s Special Status, Raising Fears of Unrest , N.Y. Times (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-jammu.html [ https://perma.cc/6LEG-JZ2X ].

^ See History , Bharatiya Janata Party , http://www.apbjp.org/eng/history [ https://perma.cc/T7H3-DTQP ].

^ See We Diluted Article 370 Twelve Times Without Controversy: Congress , India Today (Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/we-diluted-article-370-twelve-times-without-controversy-congress-1615399-2019-11-03 [ https://perma.cc/89DG-N8B9 ].

^ In fact, it is the rhetorical ability to participate in political life that cements settler colonial power. See Veracini, supra note 23, at 30.

^ Mohamad Junaid, Death and Life Under Occupation: Space, Violence, and Memory in Kashmir , in Everyday Occupations 158, 164 (Kamala Visweswaran ed., 2013); see id . at 158–90.

^ See Haley Duschinski, “ Survival Is Now Our Politics”: Kashmiri Hindu Community Identity and the Politics of Homeland , 12 Int’l J. Hindu Stud . 41, 53 (2008).

^ See generally Sten Widmalm, The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir , 37 Asian Surv . 1005 (1997) (detailing notable and perceived-as-rigged elections in Kashmir).

^ See Rifat Fareed, “ End of The Road” for Pro-India Politicians in Kashmir , Al Jazeera (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/17/end-of-the-road-for-pro-india-politicians-in-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/X63V-9YFW ].

^ Jammu and Kashmir Const., Nov. 17, 1956, art. 92.

^ India Const. art. 356.

^ Kashmir is unique in that it enters into Governor’s rule for six months before President’s rule. If the state government is not restored in those six months, the state moves from Governor’s rule to President’s rule. In both situations, power is exercised over Kashmir through the centrally appointed Governor. Muzamil Jaleel, How Governor’s Rule and President’s Rule Set J&K Apart from Other States , Indian Express (Dec. 14, 2018, 1:03 PM), https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/how-governors-rule-and-presidents-rule-set-jk-apart-from-other-states-satya-pal-malik-5492730 [ https://perma.cc/4VMX-7SKB ]; see also Prabhash K. Dutta, Why Governor’s and Not President’s Rule in Jammu and Kashmir , India Today (June 20, 2018), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/why-governor-s-and-not-president-s-rule-in-jammu-and-kashmir-1264794-2018-06-20 [ https://perma.cc/WM2J-5GYZ ].

^ India Const. art. 356. See generally Bhagwan D. Dua, Presidential Rule in India: A Study in Crisis Politics , 19 Asian Surv . 611 (1979) (conducting a systematic analysis of presidential rule in India and the way it has been used by the central government).

^ See Santosh Chaubey, Jammu & Kashmir Under Governor’s Rule for Eighth Time , India Today (June 20, 2018, 6:18 PM), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/jammu-kashmir-under-governor-s-rule-for-eighth-time-1265259-2018-06-20 [ https://perma.cc/7QGA-KZDP ].

^ Vignesh Radhakrishnan & Sumant Sen, How Many Times Has President’s Rule Been Imposed Across States? , The Hindu (Nov. 19, 2019, 6:08 PM), <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-many-times-has-presidents-rule-been-imposed-across-states/article30017580.ece ">https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-many-times-has-presidents-rule-been-imposed-across-states/article30017580.ece [ https://perma.cc/R74Q-QE6V ].

^ See infra sections IV.A–B, pp. 2546–49.

^ The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990.

^ Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978.

^ The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act was promulgated in the region in 1990 when Kashmir was under a six-year President’s rule. Amnesty Int’l, A “Lawless Law”: Detentions Under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 10 (2011) , https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/asa200012011en_11.pdf [ https://perma.cc/N8KJ-Z744 ]. Originally intended to punish timber smugglers , id . at 12, the Public Safety Act caused a peak in detentions in the early to mid-1990s, id . at 13.

^ See infra p. 2542.

^ See Khurram Abbas, Strategizing Kashmiri Freedom Struggle Through Nonviolent Means , 16 Pol’y Persps . 41, 43 (2019).

^ See Duschinski, supra note 58, at 46.

^ See Bhan et al., supra note 28, at 2.

^ See Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc’y , supra note 38, at 36–37; see also Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc’y , Structures of Violence: The Indian State in Jammu and Kashmir 10–16 (2015) (detailing a breakdown of the armed personnel in Kashmir) [hereinafter Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc'y, Structures ].

^ See Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc'y, Structures , supra note 75, at 4.

^ See Ajaz Ashraf, “ Do You Need 700,000 Soldiers to Fight 150 Militants?”: Kashmiri Rights Activist Khurram Parvez , Scroll.in (July 21, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://scroll.in/article/812010/do-you-need-700000-soldiers-to-fight-150-militants-kashmiri-rights-activist-khurram-parvez [ https://perma.cc/VR3S-V7YU ].

^ See generally Off. of the United Nations High Comm’r for Hum. Rts ., Update of the Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019 (2019), https://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Countries/IN/KashmirUpdateReport_8July2019.pdf [ https://perma.cc/SU6R-YZQR ]; Angana Chatterji et al., Buried Evidence: Unknown, Unmarked, and Mass Graves in India-Administered Kashmir (2009); Angana Chatterji et al ., Militarization with Impunity: A Brief on Rape and Murder in Shopian, Kashmir (2009).

^ “ Tinkering with Article 35A Akin to Setting Powder Keg on Fire” Mehbooba Mufti Warns Centre Against Revoking Provision , Firstpost (July 29, 2019, 1:37 AM), https://www.firstpost.com/politics/mehbooba-mufti-issues-warning-to-centre-against-revoking-article-35a-says-meddling-with-it-is-like-playing-with-fire-7069231.html [ https://perma.cc/FS4V-XFEF ].

^ Guha , supra note 26, at 78 (quoting India: Marching Through Kashmir , Time (Oct. 10, 1949), http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,800911,00.html [ https://perma.cc/CM6R-DWLD ]).

^ See Chandhoke , supra note 30, at 19.

^ Korbel , supra note 1, at 4.

^ See Lorenzo Veracini , Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview 3 (2010) (noting that settlers see themselves not as invaders, but as natives returning to their country).

^ See Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc’y , Amarnath Yatra: A Militarized Pilgrimage 9 (2017).

^ See id . at 22–24.

^ Id . at 170 (quoting Press Info. Bureau, Amarnath Yatra — 99 Acid Test of Devotion (1997)).

^ See Lorenzo Veracini , The Settler Colonial Present 38 (2015). “Kashmiri Muslims are doubly marked as the Other: first as Muslims and second as Kashmiris who are ungovernable, and committed to a [sic] irrepressible struggle for plebiscite and sovereignty.” Ather Zia, The Haunting Specter of Hindu Ethnonationalist-Neocolonial Development in the Indian Occupied Kashmir , 63 Development 60, 61 (2020).

^ Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc’y , supra note 84 , at 153–64.

^ Emily Schmall, India Promotes Hindu Pilgrimage as Sign of Peace in Kashmir , Seattle Times (Aug. 1, 2019, 5:41 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation/india-promotes-hindu-pilgrimage-as-sign-of-peace-in-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/BP29-4G3F ] (describing signs tourists see upon arriving in Kashmir); see also Alasdair Pal, India Boosts Hindu Pilgrimage to Holy Cave in Conflict-Torn Kashmir , Reuters (July 28, 2019, 1:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-india-kashmir-pilgrimage-idUKKCN1UN04Q [ https://perma.cc/MY7T-9HUV ] (noting that the state spent “$72 million on preparations for the six-week event”).

^ See Nitasha Kaul, India’s Obsession with Kashmir: Democracy, Gender, (Anti-)nationalism , 119 Feminist Rev . 126, 132 (2018). The fifth picture depicted in Article 370: The Indians Celebrating Kashmir’s New Status , BBC (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49250594 [ https://perma.cc/3NUU-YQ2L ], shows celebrating Indians after the abrogation with a poster that depicts Kashmir as the head of “Bharat Mata.”

^ See Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc’y , supra note 38, at 60.

^ See id . In July 2019, many of the security measures taken ahead of the pilgrimage facilitated the lockdown that accompanied abrogation. See Rifat Fareed, Highway Regulation for Hindu Pilgrimage Angers Kashmir Residents , Al Jazeera (July 5, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/7/5/highway-regulation-for-hindu-pilgrimage-angers-kashmir-residents [ https://perma.cc/WU8P-AT7K ].

^ Cf . Lloyd & Wolfe, supra note 15, at 114 (explaining how a part of settler colonial violence in the case of Zionism is a “persistence of a psychic ‘state of siege’: the representation of the world as . . . populated by uncivil peoples who pose . . . an ‘existential threat’ to civil subjects”).

^ See Devjyot Ghoshal & Alasdair Pal, India’s Ruling Party to Revive Plan for Hindu Settlements in Kashmir , Reuters (July 12, 2019, 4:47 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-hindu-exclusive/exclusive-indias-ruling-party-to-revive-plan-for-hindu-settlements-in-kashmir-idUSKCN1U7142 [ https://perma.cc/K94Y-M9NM ].

^ See Fayaz Wani, Over 4.30 Lakh Kanals of Land in Jammu and Kashmir Under Occupation of Security Forces , New Indian Express (Jan. 10, 2018, 8:41 PM), https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/jan/10/over-430-lakh-kanals-of-land-in-jammu-and-kashmir-under-occupation-of-security-forces-1750088.amp [ https://perma.cc/8793-GDBG ].

^ See Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc’y , supra note 38, at 42.

^ See id . at 46–47.

^ See id . at 53–54.

^ Mohamad Junaid, Opinion, Peace, Tourism and Political Games in Kashmir , Al Jazeera (July 29, 2012), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/7/29/peace-tourism-and-political-games-in-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/G7ST-6MLV ]; see also Jammu and Kashmir “Was, Is and Shall Forever” Remain Its Integral Part: India Tells Pakistan at UNHRC Meeting , Times India (Feb. 26, 2020, 10:09 PM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jk-was-is-and-shall-forever-remain-its-integral-part-india-tells-pakistan-at-unhrc-meeting/articleshow/74318873.cms [ https://perma.cc/SS8B-DXMS ].

^ Betwa Sharma, A Train Through Kashmir , N.Y. Times: India Ink (Oct. 30, 2013, 8:24 AM), https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/a-train-through-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/E5Y4-Z8B2 ].

^ Ananya Jahanara Kabir, Territory of Desire 44 (2009). Bollywood directors have begun reserving film titles to tell romanticized stories of abrogation. See Kashmir Hamara Hai to Dhara 370: Filmmakers Rush to Book Titles After Article 370 Scrapped , India Today (Aug. 7, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.indiatoday.in/movies/bollywood/story/kashmir-hamara-hai-to-dhara-370-filmmakers-rush-to-book-titles-after-article-370-scrapped-1578182-2019-08-07 [ https://perma.cc/TWW4-LMQ9 ].

^ Kabir , supra note 101, at 48; see also id . at 45–50.

^ See Kaul, supra note 90, at 132; see also A Whole New Sub-genre of Songs Emerges About Getting Kashmiri Bahus, Buying Land in Valley , Scroll.in (Aug. 12, 2019, 10:27 AM), <a href="https://scroll.in/video/933520/watch-there-is-a-whole-new-sub-genre-of-songs-inspired-by-kashmir-and-the-article-370-controversy ">https://scroll.in/video/933520/watch-there-is-a-whole-new-sub-genre-of-songs-inspired-by-kashmir-and-the-article-370-controversy [ https://perma.cc/SE6N-WAJN ].

^ Mridu Rai, Kashmiris in the Hindu Rashtra, in Majoritarian State: How Hindu Nationalism Is Changing India 259, 259 (Angana P. Chatterji et al. eds., 2019).

^ Bharatiya Janata Party , Sankalp Patra: Lok Sabha 2019 , at 12 (2019).

^ See Rifat Fareed, Panic in Kashmir After India Asks Tourists and Pilgrims to Leave , Al Jazeera (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/2/panic-in-kashmir-after-india-asks-tourists-and-pilgrims-to-leave [ https://perma.cc/GT5J-7DSN ].

^ 1 Over the course of the year leading up to the abrogation, roughly 35,000 troops were sent to Kashmir in the name of “maintaining law and order” and as part of a massive security drive. See Tariq Bhat, J&K Surge: 25,000 Troops Start Arriving; Total Since 2018 Reaches 75,000 , The Week (Aug. 2, 2019, 10:54 PM), https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2019/08/02/jk-surge-25k-troops-start-arriving-total-since-2018-reaches-75.html [ https://perma.cc/X3SK-MWNK ].

^ 1 See India Orders Tourists to Leave Kashmir Over “Terror Threat ,” BBC (Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49222571 [ https://perma.cc/6SGG-K45K ].

^ 1 See Ather Zia, Opinion, There Is Reason to Fear for the Safety of Every Kashmiri in India , Al Jazeera (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2019/8/5/there-is-reason-to-fear-for-the-safety-of-every-kashmiri-in-india [ https://perma.cc/RVN2-BNRE ].

^ 1 No Reason to Panic, Only Rumor-Mongering Going On: Governor Satya Pal Malik on Tensions in J&K , Fin. Express (Aug. 3, 2019, 7:00 PM), https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/no-reason-to-panic-only-rumor-mongering-going-on-governor-satyapal-malik-on-tensions-in-jk/1665200 [ https://perma.cc/P3KL-NNX5 ].

^ 1 See id .

^ 1 See Kashmir: Curfew-Like Restrictions Imposed on Movement of People , India Today (Aug. 5, 2019, 1:52 AM), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/jammu-and-kashmir-curfew-section-144-imposed-1577218-2019-08-05 [ https://perma.cc/DF5V-256L ].

^ 1 See Rifat Fareed, Key Kashmir Political Leaders Arrested by India Since August 5 , Al Jazeera (Aug. 17, 2019), <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/17/key-kashmir-political-leaders-arrested-by-india-since-august-5 ">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/17/key-kashmir-political-leaders-arrested-by-india-since-august-5 [ https://perma.cc/4KAB-Y76J ].

^ 1 See Kashmir: Curfew-Like Restrictions Imposed on Movement of People , supra note 112.

^ 1 In June 2018, the BJP pulled out of a coalition government with state parties in Kashmir, forcing the state first into Governor’s rule and then President’s rule. See President’s Rule in J&K Extended for 6 More Months Beginning July 3 , Econ. Times (June 12, 2019, 9:20 PM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/president-rule-in-jk-to-be-extended-for-6-more-months/articleshow/69759938.cms [ https://perma.cc/Q4CR-FC6U ].

^ 1 Ministry of Law and Justice, The Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, C.O. 272 (Notified on August 5, 2019) [hereinafter C.O. 272].

^ 1 See India Const. art. 367.

^ 1 C.O. 272, supra note 116.

^ 1 India Const. art. 370, cl. (1)(d).

^ 1 This move was criticized as unconstitutional. See, e.g ., Gautam Bhatia, The Article 370 Amendments: Key Legal Issues , Indian Const. L. & Phil . (Aug. 5, 2019), https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/08/05/the-article-370-amendments-key-legal-issues [ https://perma.cc/QM53-K4YA ]; Nivedhitha K., Guest Post: Article 370: The Constitutional Challenge , Indian Const. L. & Phil . (Aug. 13, 2019), https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/08/13/guest-post-article-370-the-constitutional-challenge [ https://perma.cc/CS4A-7RPT ].

^ 1 Specifically, C.O. 272 made two key changes to the text: (1) the Constitution’s references to the “Government of the State” would be construed to include the “ Governor of Jammu and Kashmir”; (2) for purposes of rendering Article 370 inoperative, the “‘Constituent Assembly of the State . . .’ would read ‘ Legislative Assembly of the State.’” C.O. 272, supra note 116, at cl. 2 (emphasis added).

^ 1 Id . at cl. 1(2).

^ 1 See K. Venkataramanan, Explained: How the Status of Jammu and Kashmir Is Being Changed , Hindu (Aug. 6, 2019, 10:08 AM) , https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/explained-how-the-status-of-jammu-and-kashmir-is-being-changed/article28822866.ece?homepage=true [ https://perma.cc/8TTA-BS3T ].

^ 1 Statutory Resolution (Aug. 5, 2019), http://164.100.47.5/newlobsessions/sessionno/249/S050819.pdf [ https://perma.cc/W7WE-KYQN ].

^ 1 Ministry of Law and Justice, Declaration Under Article 370(3) of the Constitution, C.O. 273 (Notified on August 6, 2019).

^ 1 The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.

^ 1 Id . §§ 3–4.

^ 1 Id . The first would have a legislature, but the second would not. Id . §§ 14, 58.

^ 1 DeshGujaratHD, Amit Shah’s Historic Announcement in Rajya Sabha on Jammu & Kashmir, 370, 35A, Ladakh , YouTube at 9:40 (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlZBHsZAmI4 [ https://perma.cc/SSE4-ZUEB ].

^ 1 See Alexandra Ma, The Phone and Internet Blackout in Kashmir Is So Total that Locals Reportedly Don’t Know India Rewrote Their Constitution , Bus. Insider (Aug. 8, 2019, 6:32 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/kashmir-blackout-locals-dont-know-india-revoked-autonomy-report-2019-8 [ https://perma.cc/M6P9-KF42 ].

^ 1 See India Celebrates Independence Day Despite Kashmir Being Under Lockdown , TRTWORLD (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.trtworld.com/asia/india-celebrates-independence-day-despite-kashmir-being-under-lockdown-29026 [ https://perma.cc/NUQ5-2YX4 ].

^ 1 See India Restores Internet in Kashmir After 7 Months of Blackout , Al Jazeera (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/5/india-restores-internet-in-kashmir-after-7-months-of-blackout [ https://perma.cc/W8ZG-VDMV ].

^ 1 See Azhar Farooq & Rebecca Ratcliffe, “ Our Hearts Are on Fire”: Kashmir Spends Eid Al-Adha in Lockdown , The Guardian (Aug. 12, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/12/our-hearts-are-on-fire-kashmir-spends-eid-al-adha-in-lockdown [ https://perma.cc/F28F-BMFA ].

^ 1 See Quratulain Rehbar, Weddings in the Time of Kashmir Lockdown , The Wire (Aug. 27, 2019), https://thewire.in/rights/weddings-in-the-time-of-kashmir-lockdown [ https://perma.cc/D5A9-JMKM ].

^ 1 See Preetika Rana & Vibhuti Agarwal, India’s Kashmir Clampdown Turns Hospitals into “Graveyards ,” Wall St. J . (Aug. 28, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/indias-kashmir-clampdown-turns-hospitals-into-graveyards-11566990962 [ https://perma.cc/C8R3-CFMW ].

^ 1 See Kashmir Clampdown Means Even Funeral Rites Can’t Be Observed , S. China Morning Post (Aug. 10, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/3022259/kashmir-clampdown-means-even-funeral-rites-cant-be-observed [ https://perma.cc/3F59-XRNX ].

^ 1 See Anando Bhakto, Kashmir’s Endless Agony , Frontline (Aug. 14, 2020), https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/kashmirs-endless-agony/article32184848.ece [ https://perma.cc/G72V-B7N9 ].

^ 1 See Alexandra Ma, Armed Forces in Kashmir Are Detaining Children and Molesting Women and Girls amid a State-Wide Blackout, Report Claims , Bus. Insider (Aug. 15, 2019, 7:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/kashmir-forces-detaining-kids-molesting-girls-amid-blackout-report-2019-8 [ https://perma.cc/6TH5-F4GY ].

^ 1 See Azhar Farooq & Rebecca Ratcliffe, “ A Storm Has Hit My Life”: The Kashmiri Families Torn Apart by Mass Arrests , The Guardian (Aug. 27, 2019, 6:26 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/27/kashmir-families-torn-apart-mass-arrests-continue-india [ https://perma.cc/6RP9-RVRL ].

^ 1 See Vakasha Sachdev, Art 370: 1 Year On, How J&K Has Been Let Down by the Supreme Court , The Quint (Aug. 5, 2020, 12:11 PM), https://www.thequint.com/news/india/1-year-of-article-370-abrogation-supreme-court-has-let-down-people-of-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/5WGJ-YGUB ].

^ 1 See, e.g ., Bhan et al., supra note 28; Haley Duschinski & Shrimoyee Nandini Ghosh, Constituting the Occupation: Preventive Detention and Permanent Emergency in Kashmir , 49 J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L . 314 (2017); Junaid, supra note 57.

^ 1 See, e.g ., Idrees Kanth, Commentary, Writing Histories in Conflict Zones , 46 Econ. & Pol. Wkly . (2011), https://www.epw.in/journal/2011/26-27/commentary/writing-histories-conflict-zones.html [ https://perma.cc/PKQ6-TCBN ].

^ 1 See, e.g ., Chandhoke , supra note 30; Seema Kazi, Sexual Crimes by State Personnel and Kashmir’s Case for Self-Determination , Kashmir Narrator , http://kashmirnarrator.com/sexual-crimes-state-personnel-kashmirs-case-self-determination [ https://perma.cc/WJ9P-W76B ].

^ 1 See, e.g ., Goldie Osuri, Imperialism, Colonialism and Sovereignty in the (Post) Colony: India and Kashmir , 38 Third World Q . 2428 (2017); Partha Chatterjee, Opinion, Kashmir Is the Test Bed for a New Model of Internal Colonialism , The Wire (Aug. 28, 2019), <a href="https://thewire.in/government/kashmir-is-the-test-bed-for-a-new-model-of-internal-colonialism ">https://thewire.in/government/kashmir-is-the-test-bed-for-a-new-model-of-internal-colonialism [ https://perma.cc/STB2-LVMG ]; Nitasha Kaul, Argument, Kashmir Is Under the Heel of India’s Colonialism , Foreign Pol’y (Aug. 13, 2019, 10:51 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/13/kashmir-is-under-the-heel-of-indias-colonialism [ https://perma.cc/4X7A-FMZJ ].

^ 1 See, e.g ., Zainab Ramahi & Azadeh Shahshahani, Destroying to Replace: Settler Colonialism from Kashmir to Palestine , Verso (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4817-destroying-to-replace-settler-colonialism-from-kashmir-to-palestine [ https://perma.cc/SS43-324G ]; Maknoon Wani, Commentary, Kashmir and the Rise of Settler Colonialism , Himal Southasian (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.himalmag.com/kashmir-and-the-rise-of-settler-colonialism-2020 [ https://perma.cc/VL6N-48QU ].

^ 1 Samreen Mushtaq & Mudasir Amin, Analysis, In Kashmir, Resistance Is Mainstream , Himal Southasian (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.himalmag.com/in-kashmir-resistance-is-mainstream-2020 [ https://perma.cc/MP6C-J78B ].

^ 1 Lloyd & Wolfe, supra note 15, at 115.

^ 1 See Jammu Kashmir Coal. of Civ. Soc'y, Structures , supra note 75, at 4.

^ 1 Off. of the United Nations High Comm’r for Hum. Rts ., supra note 78, at 13.

^ 1 The Disappeared of Indian-Administered Kashmir , Al Jazeera (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2019/8/30/the-disappeared-of-indian-administered-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/36Z6-3YD7 ].

^ 1 See sources cited supra note 78.

^ 1 The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958.

^ 1 Hum. Rts. Watch, “Everyone Lives in Fear”: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir 29 (2006) , https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/india0906web.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5QVZ-4RVS ].

^ 1 The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act pmbl.

^ 1 Hum. Rts. Watch , supra note 153, at 31.

^ 1 Naseer Ganai, 25 Years On, AFSPA Remains a Dirty Word in Jammu and Kashmir , India Today (July 9, 2015, 11:14 AM), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/afspa-disagreement-jammu-and-kashmir-armed-militancy-cmp-bjp-pdp-281441-2015-07-09 [ https://perma.cc/XEM9-E5T3 ].

^ 1 For example, officers can use lethal force against persons partaking in an unlawful assembly. The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, § 4a.

^ 1 Id . § 4b.

^ 1 Id . § 4c.

^ 1 Id . § 4d.

^ 1 Id . § 4e.

^ 1 See Haley Duschinski, Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley , 82 Anthropological Q . 691, 702 (2009).

^ 1 See Lloyd & Wolfe, supra note 15, at 114.

^ 1 Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, § 7.

^ 1 See Ass’n of Parents of Disappeared Persons & Jammu Kashmir Coal. Civ. Soc’y , Torture: Indian State’s Instrument of Control in Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir 100 (2019), https://jkccs.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/TORTURE-Indian-State%E2%80%99s-Instrument-of-Control-in-Indian-administered-Jammu-and-Kashmir.pdf [ https://perma.cc/UG85-BVKT ].

^ 1 Naga People’s Movement of Hum. Rts. v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 431, ¶ 48 (1997).

^ 1 Amnesty Int’l , India: Briefing on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 , at 3 (2005), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/84000/asa200252005en.pdf [ https://perma.cc/L78G-BAF6 ].

^ 1 The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, § 3.

^ 1 Veracini , supra note 87, at 29.

^ 1 Jaya Mala v. Home Sec’y, Gov’t of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1982 SC 1297, ¶ 7.

^ 1 Ipsita Chakravarty, Modi Wants to Give Kashmiris Same Rights as All Indians — But PSA Arrests Show that Hasn’t Happened , Scroll.in (Feb. 8, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://scroll.in/article/952478/detentions-under-psa-show-kashmir-remains-in-state-of-exception-despite-modi-governments-claims [ https://perma.cc/BD7K-LNL8 ].

^ 1 Shrimoyee Nandini Ghosh, Public Safety Act: The Making and Unmaking of the Dangerous Individual in Kashmir , Café Dissensus (Feb. 20, 2017), https://cafedissensus.com/2017/02/20/public-safety-act-the-making-and-unmaking-of-the-dangerous-individual-in-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/GBJ3-GKJB ].

^ 1 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978, §§ 3, 4.

^ 1 Id . § 6.

^ 1 Id . § 8(3)(b).

^ 1 Id . § 18(1)(a).

^ 1 Id . § 18(1)(b).

^ 1 See id . § 8(1)(a).

^ 1 See id . § 13(1)–(2).

^ 1 See id . §§ 14–16 (referring all issues to an Advisory Board).

^ 1 See India Const. art. 32; id . art. 226; Jammu and Kashmir Const. art. 103; see also Amnesty Int’l , supra note 70, at 64 (finding that the Jammu and Kashmir High Court focused “on the procedural and nominal aspects of detention at the expense of substantive protection of human rights of the detainees”).

^ 1 See Amnesty Int’l , supra note 70, at 63–64.

^ 1 See Shrimoyee Nandini Ghosh, Reflections, Crisis Constitutionalism, Permanent Emergency and the Amnesias of International Law in Jammu and Kashmir , TWAILR (May 28, 2020), https://twailr.com/crisis-constitutionalism-permanent-emergency-and-the-amnesias-of-international-law-in-jammu-and-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/WY6T-VMYT ].

^ 1 See id . The lack of justice was so devastating that it resulted in the formation of the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons. See generally Ass’n of Parents of Disappeared Persons, Kashmir, A Provisional Biography of a Journey Towards Justice for the Enforced Disappeared , https://apdpkashmir.com/ebmedia/sitename_eb/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/APDP-biography-02-02-2020.pdf [ https://perma.cc/SLX9-A5W6 ].

^ 1 See Fareed, supra note 113.

^ 1 Amnesty Int’l , supra note 70, at 9 (quoting the grounds given by a magistrate for a detention under the PSA).

^ 1 Id . at 3.

^ 1 Lloyd & Wolfe, supra note 15, at 114.

^ 1 Id . at 116.

^ 1 Following the abrogation, a senior Indian diplomat even went so far as to call for an Israel-like model of settlements for Hindus in Kashmir. See Anger over India’s Diplomat Calling for “Israel Model” in Kashmir , Al Jazeera (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/28/anger-over-indias-diplomat-calling-for-israel-model-in-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/B5Z2-FUKE ].

^ 1 Wolfe, supra note 17, at 388.

^ 1 See Zulfikar Majid, Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Attend Jammu and Kashmir Global Investors’ Summit in May , Deccan Herald (Feb. 23, 2020, 11:02 AM), https://www.deccanherald.com/business/business-news/prime-minister-narendra-modi-to-attend-jammu-and-kashmir-global-investors-summit-in-may-807308.html [ https://perma.cc/J8AJ-JVY8 ].

^ 1 See Pre-summit Investors’ Meet & Curtain Raiser, JK Glob. Invs.’ Summit , https://jkinvestorsummit.com/curtain-raiser [ https://perma.cc/F7RR-KXHN ].

^ 1 See Athar Parvaiz, In a First, Outside Companies Earn 100 Percent Mining Rights in Kashmir , Kashmir Observer (Feb. 10, 2020), https://kashmirobserver.net/2020/02/10/in-a-first-outside-companies-earn-100-percent-mining-rights-in-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/FCA2-G76Z ].

^ 1 See Azaan Javaid, Outside Firms Enter Mining Race in J&K, Lease Earnings Touch Crores from Lakhs , The Print (Feb. 6, 2020, 11:35 AM) , https://theprint.in/india/outside-firms-enter-mining-race-in-jk-lease-earnings-touch-crores-from-lakhs/360175 [ https://perma.cc/P6XN-T6TF ].

^ 1 See Nusrat Sidiq, Kashmir’s Mineral Contracts Largely Handed to Non-locals , Anadolu Agency (July 27, 2020), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/kashmir-s-mineral-contracts-largely-handed-to-non-locals/1923634 [ https://perma.cc/PD4M-R5MM ].

^ 1 See Ministry of Home Affairs, Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Adaptation of State Laws) Order, 2020, S.O. 1229(E), § 14 (Notified on March 31, 2020).

^ 1 See Lloyd & Wolfe, supra note 15, at 115 (discussing use of “registration by title” as a tool to “strengthen and regularize settler dispossession of Indigenous populations”).

^ 1 Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Adaption of State Laws) Order, 2020, § 14.

^ 1 Id .; see also Mirza Saaib Bég, Opinion, J&K’s New Domicile Order: Disenfranchising Kashmiris, One Step at a Time , The Wire (May 30, 2020), https://thewire.in/rights/kashmir-domicile-law [ https://perma.cc/ZR7E-JJX9 ].

^ 1 See Ministry of Home Affairs, Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Adaptation of State Laws) Fifth Order, 2020, S.O. 3808(E) (Notified on Oct. 26, 2020) [hereinafter Reorganisation Fifth Order]; Safwat Zargar, Explainer: What Exactly Are the Changes to Land Laws in Jammu and Kashmir? , Scroll.in (Oct. 29, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://scroll.in/article/977057/explainer-what-exactly-are-the-changes-to-land-laws-in-jammu-and-kashmir [ https://perma.cc/SWT2-KT8B ].

^ 1 In particular, the Order removed the “permanent resident” protections from the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act, Jammu and Kashmir Development Act, and the Jammu and Kashmir Land Grants Act, all of which regulated the lease and transfer of land. See Reorganisation Fifth Order, supra note 205.

^ 1 See id . § 3 (repealing statutory protections for agricultural land).

^ 1 Id . § 7.

^ 1 Omar Abdullah (@OmarAbdullah), Twitter (Oct. 27, 2020, 4:06 AM), https://twitter.com/OmarAbdullah/status/1321015482544054273 [ https://perma.cc/TSN7-994N ].

^ 1 See India Revokes Kashmir’s Special Status , supra note 2.

^ 1 Lana Tatour, Citizenship as Domination: Settler Colonialism and the Making of Palestinian Citizenship in Israel , Arab Stud. J ., Fall 2019, at 13 (quoting Vine Deloria, Jr., For Your Sins: An American Manifesto 173 (1969)).

^ 1 Ghulam Ahmad Mahjoor , A Garden Is Our Land (Gulshan Vatan Chhu Sonuy) , reprinted in The Best of Mahjoor 101, 103 (Triloki Nath Raina trans., 1989).

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Nationalism, Exclusionary Politics, and the Fate of Kashmir Under Modi’s India

Rohini mohan and praveen donthi talk to v.v. ganeshananthan and whitney terrell on fiction/non/fiction.

In this episode, journalists Rohini Mohan and Praveen Donthi talk to Fiction/Non/Fiction podcast co-hosts V.V. Ganeshananthan and Whitney Terrell about the recent widespread protests in India over the Modi government’s Citizenship Amendment Act and why many see the act as a threat to India’s secular nature and constitution. Donthi talks about his time reporting in Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, and the abrupt change in its autonomous status, announced in August; Mohan speaks about covering Assam, a state in India’s northeast where the debates over who belongs have a longer history. 

To hear the full episode, subscribe to the Fiction/Non/Fiction podcast through iTunes, Google Play, Stitcher, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app (include the forward slashes when searching). You can also listen by streaming from the player below.

Readings for the episode:

Inside India’s Sham Trials That Could Strip Millions of Citizenship by Rohini Mohan, Vice , July 29, 2019 • India’s Immigration Crackdown Could Make Millions Stateless by Rohini Mohan, Time , August 14, 2018 • Prove your grandfather is Indian: People who lack flawless paperwork cannot just be jailed as illegal migrant s by Rohini Mohan, August 2, 2019 • Prove your Grandfather is Indian: Ground Reportage on NRC • Bangalore International Centre video interview • Seasons of Trouble : Life Amid the Ruins of Sri Lanka’s Civil War by Rohini Mohan (Verso) •  Modiʼs war: Dispatches from a seething Kashmir by Praveen Donthi ( The Caravan ) September 22, 2019 • “One Solution, Gun Solution”: Ground report: Kashmir in shock and anger,  by Praveen Donthi ( The Caravan ) August 16, 2019 • The liberals who loved Modi  by Praveen Donthi ( The Caravan ) May 16, 2019

Curfewed Night by Basharat Peer • Mirza Waheed’s novels • Under Siege: Mirza Waheed on Kashmir (Lit Hub, September 10, 2019) • The Association of Small Bombs: A Novel by Karan Mahajan • The Far Field by Madhuri Vijay • Ground report: On a cold night in the new year, JNU attacked by a masked mob; Delhi Police watched , The Caravan , January 5, 2020 • India’s first-time protesters: Mothers and grandmothers stage weeks-long sit-in against citizenship law , By Niha Masih , The Washington Post , Jan. 13, 2020 • Reading the Signs: The protest poster is where art meets agitation, poetry meets politics. In India, it was born during the freedom struggle, and grew up through post-Independence struggles against inequality. With the anti-CAA protests, it embraces a new digital life. by Benita Fernando, The Indian Express , January 5, 2020 • Blood and Soil in Narendra Modi’s India , by Dexter Filkins, The New Yorker , Dec. 9, 2019 • ‘Hum Dekhenge’: Singer and writer Ali Sethi explains how to read (and interpret) Faiz’s poem , Scroll , Jan. 9, 2020 • Why the National Population Register is more dangerous than the Assam NRC , by Harsh Mander & Mohsin Alam Bhat , Scroll , Jan 12, 2020 • Pankaj Mishra and Mirza Waheed on the Death of India’s Liberal Self-Image , Scroll , Jan. 5, 2020 • Behind Campus Attack in India, Some See a Far-Right Agenda , By Kai Schultz and Suhasini Raj , The New York Times , Jan. 10, 2020 • Earlier attacks on students: Attack on art , by Anupama Katakam, Frontline Magazine, May-June 2007 • Earlier, Rohini Mohan on Kashmir in The Wire : In Kashmir, Doctors Bear Witness , Sept. 5, 2016 • Earlier, Praveen Donthi on Assam in The Caravan : How Assam’s Supreme Court-mandated NRC project is targeting and detaining Bengali Muslims, breaking families , July 1, 2018

Part I: Rohini Mohan

V.V. Ganeshananthan:  So on December 11, Indian lawmakers passed the Citizenship Amendment Act, which grants citizenship to migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, but not if they are Muslim. And Sonia Gandhi from the main opposition party called the act “a victory of narrow-minded and bigoted forces over India’s pluralism.” For our listeners who might not be familiar with this issue, could you give us some background on how and why this act was passed and why it’s so controversial?

Rohini Mohan:  The BJP, which has a majority in the Parliament, they just passed it, so it was the first time—that’s why people were watching the discussions in Parliament so closely, because we didn’t know where it would come from. So the basic idea of the Citizenship Amendment Act, which is an addition to the Citizenship Act, which defines who is a citizen of India—the basic idea is that anyone who claims persecution, has been persecuted as a Hindu, Sikh, Parsi, Jain, Buddhist, and Christian, in neighboring states of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and has come to India before 2014 December, can apply for citizenship in India. So each of these sections, people belonging to which religions, people belonging to which country, and this date of 2014—we still don’t know why these were chosen. And this was something that the government passed to say that they want to give citizenship and shelter to those who are persecuted in these countries.

How they will show whether they were persecuted, why Muslims have been excluded even though for example, Rohingyas in Burma, or Ahmadiyyas in Pakistan, or say even Hindus in Sri Lanka—these are different groups that don’t fit into this category of those who will be favored for citizenship, but actually do face persecution historically—none of these are included. So the logic of the Act has eluded all of us. So we don’t really know why this has been passed, except for this one conclusion: that this is to favor a large number of Hindus that live in our neighborhood. And also, recently, a large number of Hindus—almost, I think about 10 lakhs Hindus, the number is not clear yet—in Assam, that have recently been stripped of citizenship through another process, which is important to that area, but which is now going to happen to the rest of the country. It’s so complicated and so bureaucratic, and also extremely confusing because it is meant to be so, I think. 

Whitney Terrell: So wait, I got confused there myself. You’re saying that the Act is partially designed to restore citizenship to Hindus who had lost citizenship? How did they lose it?

T he Indian government wants to remedy the fact that many of those who have lost citizenship are Hindus themselves.

RM: So recently there was a National Registry of Citizens, which is one more bureaucratic process that happened in Assam in 2015. It started in 2018. A list of people who were citizens from the northeastern state of Assam was released. The National Registry of Citizens is a process by which every resident of Assam, which is a northeastern state in India, they’d have to apply to be included as a citizen. And the state would look at their identity papers and see if they had been in the country before 1971, which is when Bangladesh was created, and Bangladesh is a neighboring state, is a border state for Assam. So everyone applied and in 2018 19 lakhs, I think 1.9 million people, were excluded. And this actually means that they will soon lose citizenship. They’ve been stripped of citizenship and we don’t know what’s going to happen to them. They’re supposed to be deported or put in detention camp. Many of these people lost citizenship because they didn’t have the right paperwork. They didn’t have good enough paperwork. And actually, this was not something that the government expected. The process was supposed to identify illegal immigrants, and illegal immigrants in the conception of the government that wanted this process were all Bangladeshi Muslims. Bengali-speaking Muslims that came from across the border in Bangladesh.

WT:  So they ended up kicking out people that they wanted to keep.

RM: Yes. And now to keep them even surer, this Citizenship Amendment Act was passed. The Indian government tries to separate these two processes, but the Home Minister of India, Amit Shah has repeatedly said that first the Citizenship Amendment Act will be passed and then a nationwide NRC will come through. But the Citizenship Amendment Act itself has been passed after this Assam process went through. And there are a lot of people who have lost citizenship. And this is something that the Indian government wants to remedy because many of those who have lost citizenship are Hindus themselves.

WT: I just want to say that you in fact are speaking to us live from India, right? And what city are you in?

RM: I am in Bangalore.

WT: So, that is the traffic that we’re hearing in the background. Usually it’s New York traffic, but this time, it’s traffic much farther away. We’ve also been reading quite a bit about the intensity of these protests against the Modi government. There was a 24-hour strike on January 8, not exactly related to the Citizenship Amendment Act, which we’ll be calling the CAA from now on, but still. There have been targeted attacks on students in major universities like Jawarharlal Nehru University in Delhi, where there’s a strong history of activism. There was also violence on the campuses of Aligarh Muslim University and Jamia Millia Islamia University. What role have students played in these protests and what’s the situation on the ground now?

RM: Students have come out for protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act in numbers that we haven’t seen recently at all. And actually, this was sparked off by some violent reprisals in Jamia Millia Islamia, the university that you said. It’s in Delhi. Despite how the name sounds, it is a secular university, it’s a minority institution, but there are students from all communities, including Muslims, in this university. And it has very well known programs for media, for political science, and it’s a very well regarded and reputed university. And here there were demonstrations by a few students against the Citizenship Amendment Act, saying that it goes against the Constitution of India because it defines citizenship by religion when India is actually a secular country, and decidedly so from in the day of independence. And when they were protesting, the police went in and beat up large numbers of people. There’s one person who’s lost sight in one eye. There were students studying for their exams in the library; the police burst in and beat them up. Video started coming out as this was going on, because actually a lot of people who have worked in the media have studied in Jamia. When these visuals came out I think it really struck a chord across the country and one by one universities started all having protests themselves.

It galvanized more people to join in, it mobilized people who’d been silent until then, and also universities that usually stay quiet—technical universities, engineering students, all of these also. Some of the management institutions, like the Indian Institute of Management and the Indian Institute of Technology. There are several across the country—these usually stay quiet, out of politics. And they all even issued statements initially, condemning this violence, and slowly started protesting themselves.

VVG:  It’s really interesting to see the forms that some of these protests have taken. I know that a very well known actress, for example, went to JNU to express solidarity with the students shortly after that particular protest. And then there’s also a lot of women, it seems like at the forefront of these protests. Can you talk about that a little bit?

A ll of the anger, emanating from the nationalist ideas, is also mixed with the kind of patriarchy that really is the reason for a lot of repression and fear.

RM: Yeah. I think because there was initially violence against protesters, who were gathering in large numbers, there seemed to be some attempt by women to come out in the hopes that this will make the police not act violently, as they were until then. For example, there was a young man being beaten by the police in Delhi and his friends, who were all women, gathered around him and threw themselves on him to stop the police from beating their friend. And two women, Ayesha Renna, who’s 22 years old, who’s a history student, and another one, Ladida Farzana, who’s studying a Bachelor’s in Arabic—these two with their maroon hijab and spectacles—they became the face, because one of them, she stood up and there’s this photograph of her with her finger up, pointing at the policeman, who’s holding his baton up. And she’s holding her finger up at him, wanting him not to beat her friend. And this became this iconic image. And people have made so many memes out of it. And this is one face of the protest.

But there is a long-running protest—now, almost a month it’s been going on—where over 2,000 women have been coming out and sitting in this place called Shaheen Bagh, a neighborhood in Delhi. And they turn up every night with their children, they cook their food for their family, and they come and sit all night in extremely cold conditions. I know it’s colder where you are. But on December 31, there was a New Year’s Party, which was a protest party, in Shaheen Bagh, and it was the coldest Delhi has ever been in 119 years.

WT:  I wonder if you could answer this question for me. Because I’m thinking about how protests work in the United States. And we have our own nationalist president now, who proposes things that are not exactly the same as what Modi is doing in India, but not all that different. We have a Muslim ban that isn’t called a Muslim ban, but was called a Muslim ban, in terms of people traveling into the country. But we also have had the Me Too movement and had women’s marches that happened in protest of Trump, who’s seen as a harasser of women. And I wondered if the women who were involved in these protests have that also as part of it, or is that not really the deal and it’s really just protesting Modi and Hindu nationalism?

RM: During the Me Too movement, which had its echoes in India as well, a lot of women were writing online about their experiences in different industries, whether it’s media, entertainment, academics, IT industry—there were lots of women coming out then. But still many of them were anonymous. When the larger numbers of people are coming out on the streets now, there is some level of anonymity to each individual woman, and also because all of the anger, which is emanating against the nationalist ideas, is also sort of mixed with the kind of patriarchy that really is the reason for a lot of repression and a lot of fear. It’s the reason for a lot of women not to be able to go to work, a lot of them not being able to go to college, and generally unable to rise in ways as they would want to, as ambitiously as they want to. I think women coming out is being also allowed by several men, because it does help move the protests forward. This might be my cynical view, but a lot of women who are coming out are doing it on their own, but a lot of them are also doing it because their families are encouraging them to. It’s maybe a kind of beginning for several women who are say, married or from conservative communities. But it is a huge, huge door that is open now.

Part II: Praveen Donthi on Kashmir

V.V. Ganeshananthan: I’ve been following the situation in Kashmir for some years, primarily through the writing of a friend and sometime editor of mine, Basharat Peer, author of Curfewed Night , whom I think you also know. Today we’re here to talk to you about Kashmir, and Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which gave that state semi-autonomy and special status in relation to the Indian state. But on August 5, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that Article 370 would be abrogated; thousands of Indian soldiers descended on Kashmir, there were mass arrests there, and communications from Kashmir were cut off, sparking protests. For those of our listeners who may not be familiar with the state of Jammu and Kashmir’s previous special status in India, can you briefly explain how it was run before Article 370 was abrogated, and what changed then?  

Praveen Donthi:  The state of Jammu and Kashmir is the northernmost state in India, that borders Pakistan, and it’s been a bone of contention since the partition of the country soon after the British left. The very first point of interest is when the British sold Kashmir to the Rajah of Jammu at the time, a despot who was ruling Jammu. He bought it for 7.5 million. That’s when for the first time, Jammu and Kashmir state comes into being.

Whitney Terrell:  What year was that?

PD: 1846. This sort of plays on the minds of every Kashmiri, that they’ve been sold by the colonial state to the Rajah. They look at it as an illegitimate sort of thing to do. So in 1947 when the British left there were many princely states, more than three, four hundred princely states, and Jammu and Kashmir was the only princely state that really negotiated the terms of the membership with the Indian union. So, according to that, the Indian union promised some freedom to the Kashmiris, to be part of Indian union. To begin with, the Indian union only had control over three things: defense, foreign affairs and communication.

Pakistan was supposed to be a Muslim-majority state, and India was supposed to be home for the Hindus. So, the Kashmir dispute or the Kashmir conflict is a result of those pangs of Partition.

Later on, with coming of the Indian constitution in 1950, also came this Article 370 that really dictated the terms between Kashmir and Indian union. But gradually it has been eroded by the Indian state, you know, for various reasons. First Prime Minister of India Jawarharlal Nehru admitted as much in the Parliament saying the special status is just in name. It’s been hollowed out. So, this steady erosion of this Article 370 was done, you know, with stealth. It was never in your face, it was never clear to the public at large. But with the coming of the right-wing government under Narendra Modi, the Hindu nationalist government under Narendra Modi changed all that. For them, for their constituency, it is important to be seen doing certain things in the public. They’re hardliners and they want to do certain things—a sledgehammer sort of approach. And the special status was just hollow rhetoric in that sense. There was nothing to special status.

The Indian union could do whatever they wanted in the state, and  the limitation about dealing with defense, foreign affairs and communication had come to an end long ago, and they could do anything. But this government wanted to show that the special status is no more there, because the masses who support Narendra Modi wanted this sort of thing, because it was part of their election manifesto, when they first came to power in 2014, that they would be removing 370. They had warned, and they kept up their word.

The Kashmiris call it occupation because the agreement that they had with Indian union now comes to an end because this article 370 has been removed. So they are very angry, upset, they are scared because it’s the only Muslim-majority state within the Indian union. They are scared for their identity and also they’re culturally quite different from the rest of India. So they have their own insecurities and fears that they might be subsumed under the larger union and because of the Hindu nationalist agenda to convert all the Muslims back to Hinduism, and they call it coming back home. There’s a word in Hindi called Ghar Wapsi.

WT: That was a great précis. Thank you. But for our listeners who might not be familiar with the term, can you define what a princely state is?

PD:  Right. A princely state had a ruler like a prince or a Rajah. It was not directly under the rule of the British; these people were sovereign states within British India. So, the British gave the option to these princely rulers to decide if they want to join Pakistan or India, whereas those territories which were directly under the British had to directly go under Pakistan or India, depending on the religion of the population. Pakistan was supposed to be a Muslim-majority state, and India was supposed to be home for the Hindus. So, the Kashmir dispute or the Kashmir conflict is a result of those pangs of Partition. In that sense, it continues. For the Indian Muslims, Muslims of the mainland India, it’s a settled question for them, they’ve chosen India. But for Kashmiris it has been a burning question. It’s been going on since ’47. There have been various ups and downs. After 9/11, there was a crackdown on militancy in Kashmir. It’s been peaceful, but in 2008 and ’10, again, the protests started by a new generation, and they call it Intifada protests, a reference to Palestinian protests against Israel. These young boys, pelting stones at the security forces and it had taken that shape. Earlier it was said that Pakistan used to fan these protests and militancy, etc. But now, it’s more and more indigenous.

I haven’t seen anything like that before. Imagine a life without any modern means of communication. It was like a black hole. You didn’t know what was going on.

WT:  Well, yeah, speaking of that we just were talking to Rohini Mohan about the NRC and the CAA, and the protests and the rest of India. You’re talking about these protests and resistance in Kashmir too, of course, but we aren’t really seeing them because there’s a total Internet shut down in Kashmir right now, with the abrogation of Article 370. And the change in its status, which you’ve been talking about. Can you tell us what you saw on the ground when you went there and read to us from your cover story?

PD:  It was quite shocking. I haven’t seen anything like that before. Imagine a life without any modern means of communication. It was like a black hole. You didn’t know what was going on. There were rumors doing rounds everywhere. Nobody could tell what’s true and what’s not. That creates a certain kind of paranoia and fear among people and it was like—dystopic. The first dispatch I sent in August, as soon as I went—I went there after a week—this is how I started my first dispatch, which was put together in a hasty manner. 

“The sense of siege hit early, in the air, long before seeing the barbed-wire barricades and security forces armed to the teeth blocking the way. Fifteen minutes before the plane touched down at Srinagar, an announcement was made asking the passengers to close the windows. The staff went around making sure all windows are shut—“An order from the DGCA, sir,” one of the flight attendants said upon enquiry, referring to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation. First there was mild disbelief, then there was mocking. A Kashmiri passenger next to me laughed and said, “This is nazarbandi”—house arrest. Others repeated the word as if they were adding it to their vocabulary. Some of them, curious, opened the windows halfway to peep out but closed them in a hurry. It was 7:30 am and I saw a glimpse of the verdant green Valley enveloped in grey monsoon mist.

“Probably they don’t want us to see how many (security) forces they have brought into the Valley,” one person said. The passenger was coming home for Eid, which was the next day, on 12 August.  Some tried to laugh about it while others looked anxious. Soon, they had to figure out how to reach their destinations. As the flight landed on the runway, many passengers switched on their cell phones and kept staring at them, probably out of habit, and maybe some hope. The reality struck them soon enough. The Valley has been under strict lockdown since 5 August, with no communication services, when the union government effectively abrogated Article 370 of the Constitution. The green ticker at the tourist department counter next to the baggage belt kept flashing the message: ‘Welcome to the paradise on earth.'”

So that’s the end of my lede from the first dispatch.

WT: I remember that story. That’s an amazing opening. It would be so strange to land somewhere and just have your cell phone not work. Although I’m old enough to remember when that was possible everywhere.

PD:  That’s true, you know. When you are used to a certain thing, and suddenly it’s taken away from you, you feel lost. The disorientation was very evident everywhere I went.

VVG: As you were talking about this, one of the things that you mentioned is that the way that there’s this—for most of us—unimaginable space of the lack of freedom of movement, the lack of communication. There were some writing about—I remember seeing on Twitter—people talking about in their WhatsApp chats their Kashmiri friends disappearing, because after a certain period of inactivity WhatsApp deactivates your account. But you were talking about the fear of demographic change, and as I recall, Article 370, which is the special provision of the Indian constitution that gives—that gave Kashmir, I should say, in the past tense, gave Kashmir special status—so that we were referring to it as India-administered Kashmir, one of the things was about who could come to Kashmir and own property. So, when you read about from the Indian government’s rhetoric, their line on why they did this: oh, development will be so much better if people can go to Kashmir and buy property and begin businesses.

This thing about the image of Kashmir in the average Indian mind is built over time. When I was growing up in the South, I had the same fantasy.

This will be so good for jobs, this will be so good for Kashmiris—right, that’s the line that’s being put forward. And of course, you know, that’s getting at also the demographic change that Kashmiris are saying that they fear, that people will come to this place, which is already, as you wrote in that cover story, it’s the most militarized place in the world. So I was really curious to hear you talk about that. I’ve heard about this from so many Kashmiri friends and have read about it—Basharat and I used to talk about this; northern Sri Lanka is also heavily militarized—the sense of what it’s like to live with that large military presence and that sense of a minority community’s identity eroding. And Article 370 was this at least nominal protection against that and so now, am I right to understand that say, there is some question of whether Indians outside Kashmir are going to come to Kashmir, which they think of as this—you refer to “paradise,” and Kashmir holds in India’s imagination a special place. Oh, it’s so beautiful, it’s so much more beautiful than the rest of India. It’s this fantasy place. I could move there now. How does that language work? Is that actually going to happen?

PD:  I doubt that’s going to happen. It’s going to be very, very difficult because, like I’ve written in my pieces, now the legitimacy for violence, for militancy, is at an all-time high. When it started in 1989, for the first time, there was still sections of Kashmiri society who were probably very skeptical of violence and militancy and they were probably leaning towards the Indian state as a better option than the Pakistani state, which was seen as a failed state and things like that. But right now for the first time I see people of all political ideologies and shades and everybody, they’re together now, for them, it seems like the only thing that can stop the mainlanders from coming in and settling down or taking over land, property or change their culture and religion is militancy. You know, the gun.

As they say—you know, the headline of my first story was, ‘One Solution, Gun Solution.’ It’s a very pithily put but very smartly done thing. I heard that slogan everywhere. This thing about the image of Kashmir in the average Indian mind is built over time. When I was growing up in the South, I had the same fantasy. All the movies that I used to watch growing up, they were shot in Kashmir, especially the songs. The song and dance used to happen in the beautiful Mughal gardens of Kashmir. And for the first time when I went to Kashmir to cover elections I was shocked. Then I came out of that fantasy, but most Indians don’t get that opportunity. And that’s one of the reasons why they support every government move that is done in in Kashmir, because they think it’s so beautiful, it’s paradise, so you don’t want to let that go, you don’t want to lose that place to Pakistan.

Do whatever, just keep it. Even those who’ve never been there. But for them it just gives them some satisfaction to keep it within the Indian union. The Indian state’s approach has not really changed. Before the BJP and before Narendra Modi, before the Hindu nationalist government came into power into 2014, things have happened, horrible things since ’89. It’s just that, like I said, they used to do it stealthily, but the Hindu nationalist government wants to make it an electoral issue, to consolidate their voter base and keep winning the elections and in fact, just before the elections in 2019, the second term of Modi, there was a huge bomb blast that happened in a place called Pulwama in South Kashmir which killed some 40-plus security forces—that completely consolidated all the votes behind Modi and he came to power.

They’ve made this an electoral issue. if there is a consensus that that exists between liberals, leftists, centrists, and the hardliners on Kashmir. For the first time I see, this is the hypocrisy of liberals—and many of them are not going to like this—that they’ve never really raised voice on the things that were happening in Kashmir before 2014. After that, now, they’re talking about it. This time, they are talking a lot more because it gives them a handle over Modi, in the sense that it gives them a stick to beat Modi with. Otherwise, for the longest time they supported every Indian state action.

WT:  Putting on my hat of the geographically illiterate American, which I wear occasionally when necessary for the podcast, I’m just going to tell everybody the reason that when you’re talking about Kashmir’s beauty and why it’s such a interesting place and why it’s in dispute is that it’s on the northern tip of India. And it borders both India and Pakistan. And I just bet a number of our listeners don’t know that, although they might know that Led Zeppelin has a song named Kashmir. So I just wanted to get that in there.

VVG: And it’s been used as a political football in that conversation in the way that you’re saying, Praveen, that what does it mean to care about the people of Kashmir versus just caring about the handy rhetoric that they offer up to criticize Modi. It’s kind of a different thing, and a little bit later in your story that was on the cover of The Caravan magazine, you talk about, young people being detained, the detention of children, torture, police involvement in some of that, the heavy presence of security forces. And I mentioned before that Kashmir is one of the most militarized places in the world. How many additional troops are in Kashmir as of August?

PD:  Eighty thousand more troops were sent in after August, and it’s probably the highest military deployment since the beginning of the conflict in ’89. Never before have we seen so many forces in the valley, and the the funny thing is, most of them were not really told how many days they’re going to be posted in the valley. They were told that it’s at best, posting for elections, and it’s going to be a week. These guys are clueless. This communication blockade also affected a lot of security forces. They couldn’t be in touch with their families in the mainland. And they were seen hovering around the media center, where there was one solo phone for many journalists who wanted to call their families or their offices for reporting purposes. And just to say, whatever, that they’re doing fine and they need not worry. The security forces wanted access to that phone, but they couldn’t get it. I’m talking about the common soldiers, not the powerful officers at the top.

VVG: So, you mentioned this a little bit before—there’s a lot of rumor. You were saying that it’s hard to figure out what’s going on. And one of the most interesting things as I was reading your story, was the way that you were covering and tracking rumors and the way that the community was communicating with each other around these difficulties, lack of phones, and the way that the government was trying to paper that over, talking about access to landlines when people aren’t really using them anymore, or talking about, oh, people are going to school. And then the ways that the population of Kashmir coordinates certain kinds of community resistance. There’s a great phrase in the story, which I think someone says, “the state can surprise the people, but the people can also surprise the state.” What is it like to report when information is so diffuse and uncertain? How do you nail things down?

PD:  Oh, well, just by traveling to the place, checking things out for myself, talking to people. Kashmir is not a very big place. It’s very small. You could cross the valley from one end to another end in a couple of hours. It’s a very small place. I traveled extensively, as much as I could, and that was the only way. And it was it was quite scary in the sense that if something happens, there is no way to communicate to any of my fellow journalists in Srinagar or my office or my family, or anybody else. Reporting in general in Kashmir has always been very difficult because the Kashmiris don’t trust the Indian media, because since ’89, it has just become like a propaganda arm of the government, the security forces and police, etc. So as an Indian, it’s really difficult for me to even report during peacetime. So, the government had created this media center in the basement of a private hotel where they provided three, four computers with Internet connection so that they could see who’s doing what, for surveillance, e-surveillance.

So I wrote the text, I took photos of it, and one of my colleagues, he was good enough to break the password of the WiFi at the Internet center. So I sent the pictures of my story via WhatsApp, through my editors. And then, some of them actually were pooling in money because the resources are hard to come by for Indian publications. They used to send stories, videos and photos, via pen drives. People would come down, fly down from Srinagar to Delhi, and then they would send stories and there would be huge time lags. And there was no way for the office to contact journalists on the ground to confirm or to make things clear. It was just—I mean, I’ve never been through anything like this.

Transcribed by https://otter.ai and condensed and edited by V.V. Ganeshananthan. 

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The Unimaginable Beauty of Kashmir

by Mir Saeid | Sep 24, 2020 | Kashmir Diaries , Places & Travel | 2 comments

“If there is a heaven on earth, it is here, it is here, it is here!”- beautifully quoted by Emperor Jahangir on Kashmir back in the 17th century, this quote still holds true almost 4 centuries later. 

Right from its picturesque mountains, dense forests, green meadows, gushing rivers, and lakes to its warm and hospitable people- everything about Kashmir is supremely beautiful. 

From being the royal retreat of the Mughals to being high-up on every traveller’s list, the beauty of Kashmir has stood in its magnificent glory even in the most uncertain times. 

But, what makes Kashmir so unarguably beautiful that innumerable poets, authors, filmmakers, and artists around the world have dedicated their pieces of work to this land of paradise? Let’s find out!

The Unimaginable Beauty of Kashmir: 8 Reasons to prove it

1. picture perfect landscapes:.

Ever been someplace so beautiful that it was hard for you to decide which of its sights was the prettiest? Well, that’s Kashmir for you. With each of its landscapes so breathtaking, it’s hard to not fall in love with the beauty of Kashmir valley. The mighty mountains, tall chinars, pristine lakes and rivers, and nicely manicured gardens are a few of the many things that adorn the Kashmir valley. 

2. A nature lover’s paradise:

Who doesn’t love reveling in nature’s many wonders? The natural beauty of Kashmir is sure to leave you awestruck. Kashmir is abound with rich flora. You will find the magnificently large Chinar tree throughout the valley, a tree not very commonly found everywhere. This stunning color-changing tree is at the peak of its utmost beauty at the onset of autumn, making the already gorgeous Kashmir look like something straight out of a storybook.

Go a little further into the mountains and you’ll find dense forests lined with deodar, fir, pine, and cedar trees. Come spring and the tulips here are in full bloom. The many fields here in Kashmir lined with colorful tulips are sure to make your stop and stare. The lush green and flowery meadows are sure to take your heart away too!

We could go on and on about the resplendent nature of Kashmir, but to experience it for yourself, you must come here at least once.

3. A land of many pristine lakes and rivers:

The land of Kashmir is home to numerous water bodies. There is nothing quite as calming as sitting by a lake or river and just getting lost in nature’s bounty. No matter where you go in Kashmir, you are sure to come across many pristine lakes, glaciers and rivers.

A shikara ride on the Dal lake in Srinagar is a complete experience in itself. Watching the floating gardens and markets will mesmerize you. The Wular lake is yet another famous lake near Srinagar. The Mansar and Surinsar lakes are the perfect places to spend some time relaxing and rejuvenating. Gadsar lake in Sonmarg is a hidden gem that can only be reached through a trek. Similarly, the Mansalbal lake in the Ganderbal district is a bird lover’s paradise. 

Rivers like the Sindh or Indus, Lidder river, Zanskar river, and many others beautify the landscape of Kashmir multi-folds. 

Every lake and river offers an altogether different view and each one is sure to take your breath away.

4. The Lush Valleys:

The untamed and unspoiled valleys of Kashmir have their own charm. Aru Valley and Betaab Valley in Pahalgam, Nubra Valley in Ladakh, Zanskar in Leh, Baltal in Sonmarg, and the Yusmarg valley near Srinagar are some of the top ones here. These verdant valleys are surrounded by mountains and abound with lakes, waterfalls, and numerous trees and meadows. The natural beauty of Kashmir is at its peak here and will astound you in every way.

5. A land with rich culture and history:

The beauty of Kashmir isn’t just limited to its surroundings but is also deeply rooted in its rich culture and history. Over the years, Kashmir has been ruled and loved by various rulers. So, its culture is a diverse blend influenced by various other cultures.

And it is prevalent in the day-to-day life of the Kashmiris. Kashmir’s rich history is prevalent in its various historic monuments like the Pari Mahal, Shalimar Bagh, Avantipur temples, and Leh Palace. These monuments tell a story of an era gone long by and are pretty interesting places, especially for history enthusiasts.

Another thing that is deeply rooted in Kashmiri culture is the art of handicraft making. Kashmir is quite popular for its handicrafts right from the Pashmina shawl, carpets to paper mache and wood carving. When talking about Kashmir’s beauty, we just simply cannot ignore its rich culture and heritage.

• Traditional Dressing of Kashmiris
• What’s a Kashmiri Wedding Like? {Know it all}
• A-Z Guide on Kashmiri Embroidery
• Kashmiri Wazwan: A Non Vegetarian Delight

6. Soothing Weather:

Even on the harshest of summer days, Kashmir has pretty soothing weather. So, where temperature rises over 40 degrees celsius in the rest of the country, Kashmir is the perfect place to visit. The early winter is also a great time to visit Kashmir for an incredible snowy experience.

Kashmir basically turns into a wonderland as the winter season sets in. The snow-capped mountains and white surroundings are quite a sight to behold. The autumn season here is quite charming too. As the trees change their colors and the weather turns pleasant, Kashmir in autumn looks as pretty as a picture.

7. There is something for everyone here:

Right from the adventurous soul, the trekking enthusiast, the nature lover, leisure seeker, and every kind of person in-between, the beauty of Kashmir has something to offer to everyone. The adventurous soul can feel the adrenaline rush by taking part in various adventurous activities.

Kashmir is basically a hub for those who love adventure. Whereas, the leisure seeker can just bask in the beauty of the Kashmir valley. Nobody ever leaves the Kashmir valley disappointed. 

8. The warm and friendly people:

The beauty of a place cannot be complete without its warm and friendly locals. And the same goes for Kashmir too. As soon as you set foot on this paradisiacal land, the warm people here will welcome you with open arms. 

We tried to summarize the beauty of Kashmir in 8 points. But you can only experience it for yourself when you visit this magical place. 

The whole of Kashmir is undoubtedly, very beautiful. Here are a few places whose beauty you absolutely must not miss.

Beauty of Kashmir valley in 6 places:

1. srinagar:.

The summer capital of Jammu & Kashmir, Srinagar is a city that you absolutely must visit. This is also the largest city in Kashmir. Dal lake is one of the major reasons why tourists are attracted to this city. Staying on the stationary houseboats, a ride on the Shikara are some of the things that you must do here. This is also a paradise for all photography enthusiasts. 

2. Gulmarg:

Also known as the ‘Meadow of flowers’, Gulmarg is a beautiful place to visit. This place is also known to be one of the best skiing destinations in the world. A ride in the Gondola or the cable car is one of the top things to do here, offering a complete view of this gorgeous hill station.

Gulmarg is a true paradise for all snow lovers and adventure seekers. Nature is also quite splendid here. Gulmarg is generously blessed with a huge variety of flowers, lakes, and lush green surroundings.

3. Sonmarg:

Sonmarg is yet another splendid place to visit in Kashmir. Like the rest of the Kashmir valley, Sonmarg too, is abound with natural beauty. Participate in some adventure sports or just take some time off and marvel at nature’s bounty when in Sonmarg.

4. Pahalgam :

This is THE place to be for all enthusiastic trekkers. From some easy to the most challenging treks, Pahalgam has everything. Pahalgam is also a place that you go to when you are looking for some serenity away from the grind of daily life. With its enchanting beauty that truly looks out of this world, Pahalgam is sure to give you an experience of a lifetime.

Wish to Travel to Kashmir?

5. Yusmarg:

This is one of the offbeat places in Kashmir that you must visit. Head to Yusmarg for some peace and quiet and unwind yourself amidst nature. Come here once and we are sure that you wouldn’t want to leave this extremely serene place.

6. Patnitop:

Picturesque scenery is what defines Patnitop the best. With a plethora of activities to do and numerous sights to behold, Patnitop is one of the best places in Kashmir.

Over to You

Of course, these 6 places are just some of the many amazing places in Kashmir. The mountains, the rivers, the lakes, the trees, the saffron and tulip fields, the valleys- everything about Kashmir is unfathomably beautiful. It is said that the beauty of Kashmir can turn anyone into a poet. And rightly so. With a trip to Kashmir, you are in for a wonderful surprise. It is an experience of a lifetime, a memory to cherish forever.

If you wish to pashmina , salwar kameez , kaftan , kurtis , buy dry fruits , premium quality attar perfumes , himalayan shilajit , organic honey , and kesar , you must visit our shopping page .

You may also like reading:

• 23 Famous Mughal Monuments That You MUST Know
• Everything that You Need to Know About Kashmiri Paper Mache Crafts
• Get to Know the 11 Oldest Languages in the World

Mir Saeid is the Growth Hacker of Kashmirica , a brand that is poised to ‘Bring Exclusives from Kashmir to You’. An enthusiastic cultural entrepreneur, he is driven by a passion to bring about a social impact. He has a Masters in International Business from the University of Bedfordshire and has worked in leading Marketing positions at various SMEs and Startups for 8+ years.

Intrigued by the crafts of his birthplace,  he decided to bring the art on the Global Connoisseur through the internet. A polyglot who speaks English, Arabic, Urdu & Koshur, Mir loves traveling, reading, writing, and spending time on the cricket field – a passion rekindled just recently.

I am impressed by the quality of your blogs. Keep it up.

Thanks a lot, Sir 🙂

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Indian police condemn BBC for article on press freedom in Kashmir

Police in Indian-administered Kashmir threaten to initiate legal action against the British broadcaster for reporting on media crackdown in disputed region.

Police in Indian-administered Kashmir have “strongly objected” to an article published by the BBC on press freedom in the Muslim-majority region and threatened to take legal action for “unfairly castigating” its work.

The report by the British broadcaster, headlined “Any story could be your last” – India’s crackdown on Kashmir press, was published on Friday and highlights the case of several Kashmiri journalists incarcerated on “terrorism” charges, under which bail is difficult to get.

Keep reading

‘deadly blow’: india blocks independent kashmiri news outlet, india’s kashmir clampdown continues four years after article 370 abrogated, india says ready for polls in kashmir as top court hears article 370 pleas.

The report also documents the day-to-day harassment and intimidation other journalists have faced from security forces.

“The article unfairly castigates efforts of J&K Police in maintaining law and order and security in J&K as biased against journalists,” the Jammu and Kashmir Police said in a post on X, formerly known as Twitter.

The police force “condemned” the attempt by the BBC to misrepresent the situation on the ground, adding it maintains “the highest standards of professionalism”.

Rebuttal J&K Police strongly objects to an article published by the BBC on 1 September 2023, “Any story could be your last – India’s crackdown on Kashmir Press” by Yogita Limaye. The article unfairly castigates efforts of J&K Police in maintaining law and order and security in… — J&K Police (@JmuKmrPolice) September 2, 2023

The yearlong investigation by the BBC was published just weeks after an independent Kashmiri news outlet, The Kashmir Walla, said Indian authorities had blocked access to its website.

A number of Kashmiri journalists have been arrested, questioned and  investigated in relation to their work since India’s Hindu nationalist government scrapped the region’s semi-autonomous status in 2019 as part of its efforts to integrate the disputed territory into the rest of the country.

Anti-India sentiment runs high in the Himalayan region, which has seen a bloody rebellion since the late 1980s. The rebels either want Kashmir to be independent or merged into neighbouring Pakistan.

India has accused Pakistan of backing the rebels, a charge Islamabad has denied.

New Delhi says its unprecedented action in 2019 was aimed at rooting out “terrorism” from the territory , which is claimed by both India and Pakistan. Each of the two arch-foes administer parts of it. They have fought two of their three wars over the region since gaining independence from the British in 1947.

‘Sinister campaign’

The BBC said its reporter spoke to more than two dozen Kashmir journalists for the article. They included editors and reporters working for independent and national media organisations.

“The BBC has spent more than a year investigating accusations against the Indian government that it is running a sinister and systematic campaign to intimidate and silence the press in the region,” the broadcaster said.

“We had to meet journalists in secret, and they asked for their names to be hidden, fearing reprisals.”

All of those interviewed said the government’s arbitrary arrests of media personalities was to send all journalists a “warning”.

One of the cases highlighted by the UK outlet was that of Aasif Sultan , who worked as an assistant editor for a Srinagar-based English magazine.

Sultan has been in prison since August 2018 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act or UAPA, and is accused of “harbouring known militants”, an allegation he denies.

He has also been charged with murder, attempt to murder and other crimes.

The case of Fahad Shah – founding editor of The Kashmir Walla, who was arrested by Indian police under an “anti-terror” law last year in February – is also detailed in the report.

He was accused of “glorifying terrorism” and “spreading fake news”. In their post on X, the Kashmir police defended Shah’s arrest.

“It is pertinent to mention that one of the cases mentioned, … that of Fahad Shah, is one where a trial is already ongoing … and the court has already framed charges against him under the UAPA for providing terror sympathisers a platform for advocating terrorism,” the police said.

This year, the media watchdog Committee to Protect Journalists said 62 journalists have been killed in India in connection with their work since 1992.

Indian-administered Kashmir witnessed more internet shutdowns than any other country in the world last year, according to Surfshark, a virtual private network provider.

India has slipped in the press freedom index since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. It ranks at 161 in a list of 180 countries.

BBC offices were raided earlier this year after the broadcaster aired a documentary that questioned Modi’s role in the 2002 Gujarat riots that killed more than 1,000 people.

Hospitals must obtain written consent for pelvic and similar exams, the federal government says

New federal guidance says hospitals must obtain written informed consent from patients before subjecting them to pelvic exams and exams of other sensitive areas — especially if an exam will be done while the patient is unconscious

Hospitals must obtain written informed consent from patients before subjecting them to pelvic exams and exams of other sensitive areas — especially if an exam will be done while the patient is unconscious, the federal government said Monday.

New guidance from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services now requires consent for breast, pelvic, prostate and rectal exams for “educational and training purposes” performed by medical students, nurse practitioners or physician assistants.

The department's release said the guidance was issued to “reiterate and provide clarity” regarding hospital consent requirements. Federal regulations previously mentioned obtaining consent for “important tasks” related to surgeries, and did not provide the level of detail about medical students.

If hospitals don’t obtain explicit consent, they may be ineligible for participation in Medicare and Medicaid programs, and also may be subject to fines and investigations if they violate patient privacy laws, Office of Civil Rights director Melanie Fontes Rainer said.

Doctors and medical students sometimes perform exams of sensitive areas for training purposes when a patient is under anesthesia. At least 20 states have passed laws requiring a patient's consent.

HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra and other top health officials criticized these exams happening without explicit consent in a letter sent to teaching hospitals and medical schools Monday. The letter said hospitals need to set “clear guidelines to ensure providers and trainees performing these examinations first obtain and document informed consent.”

It's difficult to say how often these exams take place, experts said, or how often patients understand what they're consenting to when they sign forms before surgery giving broad consent for a range of procedures.

The letter is a “critical leap forward in protecting patients and medical residents," Scott Berkowitz, founder and president of the Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network, said in a statement.

“It’s a shocking problem with a very simple solution — hospitals need to ask for consent clearly and explicitly,” he said.

Alexandra Fountaine, a medical student at Ohio University who testified in front of a state House committee against the practice, was skeptical that the letter would result in “actual policy or real change.” But, she added, it made her feel more protected and respected.

“Something like that happening is my biggest fear,” she said. “As women we’re all afraid of being violated on a daily basis … but when we’re put in very vulnerable positions, like being anesthetized, I think that’s especially terrifying.”

The Associated Press Health and Science Department receives support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The AP is solely responsible for all content.

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Valerie Bertinelli talks dating, new cookbook and 'wistful' thinking about Eddie Van Halen

In a weekly series,  USA TODAY’s The Essentials , celebrities share what fuels their lives.

There were years when Valerie Bertinelli stopped cooking, drained by the effort of uncoupling from a broken marriage .

"I just got tired of pretending I was happy when I wasn't happy," says the "One Day at a Time" and "Valerie's Home Cooking" star, as she grieved losing her mom Nancy and ex Eddie Van Halen in rapid succession in 2019 and 2020. Two years later, she divorced Tom Vitale , her husband of nearly 11 years. "I have maybe 20, 25 years left of this lifetime, and I want to live it authentically."

Bertinelli, 63, says she had developed a relationship with food that wasn't healthy. "In my toolbox of things on how to deal with any kind of emotion I'm going through that I do not want to feel, I take out food, sometimes I take out alcohol," she says. "Until I decided to truly feel my pain and walk through it and get to the other side, nothing in my life was going to change.

"And that's what I did. It was a really hard but incredibly fulfilling last two years, learning that I could run with the breeze in my hair and feel true joy."

Deglammed in glasses and a T-shirt, Bertinelli pets Batman, her Zoom-bombing cat, as she discusses her latest cookbook "Indulge" (Harvest, out Tuesday), dating again and finding joy.

'I’m incredibly grateful for him': Valerie Bertinelli is in a relationship after divorce

Valerie Bertinelli is done with restriction: 'I bought into diet culture'

"I'm the (expletive) poster child" for being food- and weight-shamed, she says. " I lose weight on Jenny Craig  and I'm lovable? I was lovable before. That messed with my mind, I bought into diet culture hook, line and sinker like everybody else."

She got back in the kitchen again as a means of nourishing herself, both physically and emotionally.

The act of indulging "has been given a bad rap," she says. " 'I'm going to cheat this weekend.' It’s not cheating. We need to allow ourselves the pleasure of our lives. Food is a big, important part of my life."

What Valerie Bertinelli eats to start her day

"I'll scramble an egg with some greens, whether it be kale or spinach, and maybe put a little bit of cheese on top and then a tortilla and roll that up," she says.

She also loves toasted sourdough "with butter, peanut butter, some sliced banana and honey. Delicious. These are all foods I would have restricted myself from eating."

She's doing more plant-based cooking, and her favorite treat food is honestly pretty healthy

Bertinelli gravitates toward fruits and vegetables "just because it tastes good, and I know they have more vitamins and nutrients. I do try to get enough protein, but I don't restrict carbs because I don't like restriction."

Her preferred treat food? "A nice, crisp cold apple and (homemade) crunchy peanut butter. Oh, I love that."

The kitchen gadgets she uses constantly

"I use my Breville air fryer almost every day, either to roast some salmon or heat up a frozen pizza. I'm not ashamed to eat a frozen pizza. There's no judgment in my kitchen," Bertinelli says. "I love my coffee machine. I have an espresso and a Jura and I love them both."

What's on Valerie Bertinelli's cooking playlist?

"Obviously, I listen to Wolfie a lot," she says, referring to her musician son Wolfgang Van Halen . "When I was going through the worst of it, Kelly Clarkson . Those were anthems in this house. She knows how to write about pain and determination and growing from it really, really well."

Valerie Bertinelli is shrugging off speculation about her weight loss

"I've gotten to the point where I just don't (expletive) care what people think I’ve done," she says and recently told a commenter on Instagram that  she isn't taking Ozempic . "If somebody wants to use weight-loss drugs, if they want to use Jenny Craig, if they want to use  Weight Watchers  − I am not here to judge how anybody wants to release weight from their body. I wasn't losing weight, I was releasing pain from my body, and that's the way it happened for me. 

"People look at pictures of me that were taken (at the Oscars) and say, 'Oh, my God, she lost it overnight!' Are you kidding me? You’re going to compartmentalize everything I've been through and just say, poof, I did it? I worked (expletive) hard on my emotions."

She and Eddie Van Halen were in 'a very wonderful place' at the end of his life

In one of the cookbook’s intimate essays, Bertinelli writes that "though we got divorced, Ed and I never stopped loving each other. Who knows, if not for cancer, we might have had a second wind," but "I'm pretty sure that is wistful thinking."

She clarifies to USA TODAY that "wistful is a very different word than wishful. It was a wistful fantasy that I knew would never be true. The love that Ed and I shared − and we did come to a very wonderful place at the end of his life − was our unconditional love for our son. My son was losing his father, I was in a relationship that was terribly wrong for me, and I was holding onto some sort of lifeline because of the years I had with Ed. I was madly in love with him when I met him, but our love changed. He felt like a big brother to me that I just wanted the best for by the time he got very sick. All I wanted to do was make it OK for Ed, make it OK for Wolfie.

"You fantasize and romanticize what you know really never could be."

Surprise! Valerie Bertinelli didn't expect it, but she's dating again

" I've met someone. And I'm incredibly grateful for him," she says. "It's unlike any relationship that I’ve ever experienced with a man. I don't want to say too much, but I feel incredibly blessed and lucky to have met him. I was going to die with my six cats and my dog and be incredibly happy doing it."

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

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Jill Biden wrote children’s book about her White House cat, Willow, that will be published in June

FILE - Willow, the Biden family’s new pet cat, wanders around the White House on Wednesday, Jan. 27, 2022 in Washington. Jill Biden has written a children’s picture book about her White House cat, Willow, that will be published in June. Simon & Schuster announced Wednesday, March 27, 2024, that “Willow the White House Cat” tells the story of how the short-haired tabby ended up at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. (Erin Scott/The White House via AP, File)

First lady Jill Biden arrives for a Women’s History Month reception in the East Room of the White House, Monday, March 18, 2024, in Washington. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci)

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Jill Biden has written a children’s picture book about her White House cat, Willow , that will be published in June.

Simon & Schuster announced Wednesday that “Willow the White House Cat” tells the story of how the short-haired tabby ended up at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave.

Aides previously had said the cat impressed Jill Biden after it jumped on stage as she spoke at a Pennsylvania farm during the 2020 presidential campaign. Biden later adopted the cat and named it after her hometown of Willow Grove, Pennsylvania.

“As Willow bounds from room to room, exploring history in her new home, she learns quickly about all of the incredible people who make the ‘People’s House’ run,” the first lady said in the publisher’s announcement. “They welcomed Willow with love and care, just as they did Joe and me, the First Families who came before us, and all of the people who step foot into this home.

“Making many new friends along the way, Willow’s journey gives the world a ‘cats-eye’ view of all the ins and outs of America’s most famous address,” she said.

Willow, now 4 years old, is the only Biden pet still living at the White House. They have had three German shepherd dogs. Champ died in 2021, and Major and later Commander were sent away after exhibiting aggressive behavior, including biting Secret Service personnel and members of the White House staff.

Presidential pets are an enduring source of public fascination and often the subject of books. George H.W. Bush’s dog, Millie, “opined” on her White House life in “Millie’s Book,” and first lady Hillary Clinton wrote a book about the letters that were sent to her family pets, cat Socks and dog Buddy. Books have also been written about President Barack Obama’s white-chested Portuguese water dog, Bo.

“Willow the White House Cat” will be published by Paula Wiseman Books, an imprint of Simon & Schuster Children’s Publishing. It was co-written with award-winning author Alyssa Satin Capucilli and illustrated by acclaimed artist Kate Berube. Jill Biden will donate proceeds from sales of the book to charities that support military dogs.

The first lady’s previous children’s titles are “Don’t Forget, God Bless Our Troops” and “Joey: The Story of Joe Biden.” She published her memoir, “Where the Light Enters,” in 2019.